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The purpose of this thesis is to determine if the Marine
Corps 1 Unit Deployment Program (UDP) for fighter aviation
should be changed from six-month deployment evolutions to
one-year evolutions. The emphasis is on possible cost
reductions and the impacts that a change in deployment time
length will have on aircraft readiness, aircrew training
readiness, and personnel retention.
The beginning of this decade witnessed a giant leap in
military capability and readiness. Higher budgets voted by
Congress allowed the military to expand following the
slowdown experienced after the end of the Vietnam Conflict.
Between 1970 and 1975, the defense budget, adjusted for
inflation, declined by 22 percent. During the post-Vietnam
period, from 1976 to 1980, the real defense budget grew by
an average of two percent per year. Real spending for
procurement and for operations and maintenance actually
increased four percent annually due to a six percent decline
in personnel levels. [Ref. 1] During the Reagan defense
build-up from 1981 to 1986, the real dollar growth for
outlays averaged approximately eight percent per year
[Ref. 2]. Large increases in budgets over a short time
period resulted in some inefficiency in the creation and
maintenance of our current force level. Consequently,
Congress and the press have been voracious in their attacks
on military fraud, waste, and abuse.
Today's environment is one of an austere budget in
comparison to the early 1980s. After experiencing decreases
in real budget authority of 3.3 percent in fiscal year (FY)
1987 and 2.9 percent in FY 1988, the Defense Department's
real budget was cut $32.5 billion relative to current
services for FY 1989. This cut represents a 0.7 percent
real decline in budget authority. [Ref. 3] Budget cutbacks
have forced the military to scale back weapon system
purchases resulting in more costly systems. Many systems
have been cancelled outright. The challenge for the
Department of Defense is to maintain the military
capabilities and readiness gained during the early eighties.
Our military services must voluntarily seek out inefficiency
and reduce costs wherever it can. Where in the past we have
sought to maximize our capabilities, regardless of cost, we
must now balance our capabilities with their cost.
B. OBJECTIVE
The objective of this thesis is to examine the marginal
costs and benefits associated with changing from Western
Pacific (WestPac) deployments of six months duration to
deployments of one-year. The author hopes this study will
provide the impetus for Headquarters, United States Marine
Corps (HQMC) to re-examine UDP for fighter aviation. The
possibility exists for expanding potential cost savings to
other fixed wing aircraft communities without sacrificing
capability, readiness, or morale.
C. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
This study focuses on U.S. Marine Corps fighter
squadrons participating in UDP from FY 1977 through FY 1988.
Since the emphasis of this thesis is on potential cost
savings, the cost of transporting personnel to and from
WestPac is analyzed for the two alternatives and forecasts
are projected through 1993. No attempt is made to place
dollar values on the positive or negative benefits to
aircraft readiness, aircrew training readiness, or personnel
retention. They are considered either positive or negative
with no emphasis on magnitude.
This thesis is not severely limited or constrained by
lack of data. Although actual cost figures for
transportation are not available, the indexes on which the
actual costs were based are available from the Military
Airlift Command (MAC) . Detailed records are maintained for
aircraft maintenance, aircrew training, and personnel
reenlistments. These records are used as the basis for
examining possible benefits accrued by changing WestPac tour
lengths.
This thesis does not consider the possible effects of a
one-year deployment program on personnel assignment policy
or on deployment allowances. Since most enlistments are for
four-year terms, the impact on first term enlistees may not
be significant. Personnel deploying to MCAS Iwakuni, Japan
receive a daily per diem allowance. Personnel assigned
there as a permanent change of station (PCS) receive a cost
of living allowance (COLA) based on geographic location,
rank, and time-in-service. Whether personnel deploying for
one year would receive a per diem allowance or be paid COLA
should be considered in any follow-on analyses.
The Joint Federal Travel Regulations limit the period of
temporary deployment to six-months. This limitation does
not apply to personnel deployed afloat. Approval of
temporary duty for periods in excess of six months must be
obtained from the service secretary. [Ref. 4] For UDP to
change to one-year evolutions, new legislation for
exemption, similar to the duty afloat provisions, may be
reguired. The overall legality and methods of approving the
extended UDP are not explored in this thesis.
D. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Regression models have been developed to estimate future
transportation costs. Based on these models, an
undiscounted sum of approximately $4 million (1988 dollars)
can be saved over the next five years if UDP changes to one-
year deployments. Analysis of maintenance data, aircrew
training records, and reenlistment rates indicates that if
sguadrons deploy for one year vice six months, neither
readiness nor morale will suffer, and may even improve.
II. BACKGROUND
The Marine Corps maintains two fighter squadrons at MCAS
Iwakuni, Japan to provide anti-air warfare and close air
support for U.S. forces stationed in WestPac. One of the
squadrons is provided by Marine Aircraft Group - 31 (MAG-
31), MCAS Beaufort, SC on a six-month rotational basis. The
other squadron is provided by MAG-11, MCAS El Toro, CA on
the same basis. When MAG-24, MCAS Kaneohe Bay, HI completes
transition to the F/A-18 Hornet, it will assume MAG-24 's
responsibility for maintaining one squadron. While
stationed at Iwakuni, both fighter squadrons report to the
Commanding Officer, MAG-12, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.
Prior to the Vietnam Conflict, fighter squadrons rotated
to WestPac for 12 to 15 months. These units were stabilized
several months before transplacement . Approximately one
half of the assigned personnel were first term Marines.
With the advent of the Vietnam Conflict, unit rotation
dissappeared. The large numbers of fighter squadrons and
the number of replacements involved forced the Marine Corp
to send personnel to WestPac on individual orders. The
orders were issued as PCS and covered approximately 13
months.
In the fall of 1975, the Commandant of the Marine Corps,
General Louis Wilson, became concerned with the overall lack
of unit readiness due to personnel deficiencies. Of eight
battalions assigned to the 2nd Marine Division, one was
rated P-l (> 90% manned) , one P-2 (> 80% manned) , one P-3 (>
70% manned) , and 5 P-4 (< 70% manned) . The Commandant
wanted high, uniform readiness. There were several means of
solving this readiness problem: (1) by reducing transient
man-years associated with PCS moves and the resulting leave,
(2) by increasing the pool of personnel available for
deployment, and (3) by controlling personnel assignment from
HQMC. [Ref. 5]
In addition to personnel assignment problems, the
Commandant wanted to lessen the hardships of unaccompanied
one-year tours (without dependents) , increase the unit
cohesiveness, increase the leader-to-led time, and decrease
total PCS costs. A study in 1974 indicated that only one of
three Marines completed his/her entire enlistment contract.
The length of unaccompanied overseas tours was cited as one
of the reasons. Since personnel remain with their WestPac
units only a maximum of 13 months, units fail to develop
identities and cohesiveness suffers. In 1976, the average
contact between unit leaders/supervisors and their
subordinates was an unacceptable 16 to 17 months. And
finally, a reduction in PCS cost was necessitated by a 1974
initiative of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Manpower and Reserve Affairs to reduce the number of PCS
moves. [Ref. 6]
The Commandant approved UDP in late 1976. In June 1977,
VMFA-251 began the Marine Corps' UDP by deploying to Iwakuni
for 12 months. They replaced a permanent sguadron, VMFA-115
which returned to Beaufort. One year later VMFA-251 would
be replaced by VMFA-122, also on a one-year tour. The
initial one-year UDP was necessitated by a change in
aircraft models taking place in Beaufort. Problems were
developed in the reconfiguring of engines from the GE-J79-
10A to the -10B model. [Ref. 7] VMFA-235 deployed from
Hawaii in October 1977, three months after VMFA-251 began
its WestPac committment. 'VMFA-235 also replaced a permanent
squadron, VMFA-232, which redeployed to Hawaii. The
squadrons rotating from Hawaii were all on six-month tours.
A complete chronology of WestPac deployments for fighter
squadrons is provided in Appendix A.
Support for the program has been overwhelming, even for
the initial one-year deployments. The Commanding Officer of
the first deployment believes that his squadron morale did
not suffer from serving along side the six-month squadrons.
[Ref. 8]. Since the implementation of UDP, the Marine Corps
has realized several significant benefits: (1) stabilization
in tactical units for up to three years, enhancing
continuity and increasing the leader-to-led association, (2)
support for standardization and interoperability of the
interchangeable parts of a Marine Air/Ground Task Force, (3)
support of the maritime prepositioning concept for deploying
to pre-staged equipment, and (4) improvement of family
stability through reduction of PCS moves. [Ref. 9]
As of FY 1987, almost 13,000 PCS moves are being saved
annually. The net effect on the budget is an annual savings
of approximately $5 million. The Marine Corps is also
realizing savings in transient man-years of over 1,000 in FY
1987. This equates to a savings of $30 million. Although
great savings have been accrued since 1977, the Marine Corps
is expanding UDP to include tank companies, amphibious
tractor companies, and artillery batteries. By the end of
FY 1990 over 10,000 PCS billets in WestPac will have been
converted to temporary additional duty billets. [Ref. 10]
III. METHODOLOGY
A. GENERAL
The field of economics can be described as either
normative or positive. "Positive economics describes,
explains, and predicts actual economic phenomena and is
devoid of value judgment." The goodness or badness of
different states is not considered. "Normative economics,
on the other hand, explicitly introduces value judgments or
norms." [Ref. 11] The relative desirability of different
states is considered.
A vehicle for comparing or considering two or more
different states is a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) . It is "an
estimation and evaluation of net benefits associated with
alternatives for achieving defined public goals" [Ref. 12].
CBA works well in the area of normative economics since the
decision to implement or change a project leads from one
state to another, and the desire is to determine which state
is the best alternative.
B. CRITERIA
The process of choosing the best alternative requires a
judgment based on specific criteria and an analysis of the
alternatives according to the criteria. In developing the
criteria, many preferences should be taken into account. In
the case of this particular study, we must, at a minimum,
consider individual preferences since they will affect
retention and readiness for Marine fighter aviation. Four
popular criteria should be considered: (1) unanimity, (2)
Pareto superiority, (3) majority rule, and (4) potential
Pareto superiority. According to Sassone and Shaffer, the
first three can easily be discounted. The fourth, potential
Pareto superiority, is applicable to this case and lends
itself well to CBA. A project is determined superior if
those who gain from the project can compensate those who
lose so that no one is worse off for the project being
accepted. Essentially, it says that this criterion chooses
the alternative with the greatest net benefits. [Ref. 13]
C. PROBLEM DEFINITION
Due to huge government deficits, the Marine Corps 1
external environment can be characterized as one of budget
austerity. It is incumbent upon us to hold down costs while
attempting to maintain our present capabilities.
Consequently, the null hypothesis for the CBA can be stated
as:
deploying fighter squadrons to Japan on a six-month
rotational basis is the least cost approach to providing
the anti-air warfare assets necessary to fulfill the
mission of MAG-12.
In testing the null hypothesis, only one alternative will be
analyzed: deployment on a one-year rotational basis.
In analyzing the costs and benefits of the two programs,
care will be taken to minimize the probability of a type I
error, rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true, while
considering a type II error, rejecting a null hypothesis
when it is false.
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D. ANALYSIS DESIGN
Analysis will be centered around transportation costs.
Only those costs which are different for the two programs
will be analyzed. The applicable transportation costs
consist of those for: (1) advanced party personnel, (2) main
body personnel, (3) rear party personnel, and (4) equipment.
An appropriate cost deflator will be used to ensure proper
comparisons are made.
Three other areas deserve analysis. They include
aircraft readiness, aircrew training readiness, and
personnel retention. These areas are difficult to quantify
in monetary terms and can be considered incommensurables in
the decision-making process. Acceptance or rejection of the
null hypothesis cannot be made based on transportation costs
alone. Inclusion of the incommensurables in the CBA
requires subjective weighting, making any absolute decision
suspect. To preclude the problem of subjectivity in
comparing the two programs, the hypothesis will be rejected
only if the costs are less for the alternative and the other
areas mentioned for consideration have an equal or positive
impact. In other words, a change in programs will not be
recommended if the consequence of that change could be a
reduction in personnel retention, a decrease in aircraft




Difficulty was encountered in obtaining transportation
costs for UDP. Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (HQMC)
,
Fleet Marine Force (FMFLant) , Atlantic, and Fleet Marine
Force, Pacific (FMFPac) were queried for historical costs.
Neither the Aviation, the Manpower, nor the Logistics
Branches at HQMC held worthwhile data. Neither the
Comptroller Branch nor the Logistics Branches of FMFLant or
FMFPac maintained UDP cost data past two prior years.
Because transportation data is aggregated when computerized
by the Comptrollers, breakdowns by date or unit were
unavailable. However, cost data for the past two years was
obtained from the Mobility Section of the Logistics Branch
at FMFLant. Marine Aircraft Group - 31 and several of the
deploying squadrons were checked for data; the results were
negative.
The Military Airlift Command (MAC) , Scott Air Force Base
was checked for the detailed, historical cost data required
for this analysis. Historical costs were not available, but
the Comptroller (Code ACIB) , maintains pricing data for
determining the actual costs charged to transportation
users. CAT B rates are used to determine costs for
contracting commercial Special Airlift Missions (SAAM)
.
These rates existed from FY 1979 through FY 1988 and are
used in the main body transportation analysis. CAT Y rates
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are used to charge for individual travel on MAC scheduled
commercial airline flights between the U.S. and overseas
bases. Rates were obtained for flights originating from Los
Angeles, St. Louis, and Honolulu with service to Tokyo,
Japan and return. Rates covered CY 1983 through CY 1989.
Equipment transportation costs are determined from C-141
flying hour rates. These tariffs were available from FY
1982 through FY 1989.
B. AIRCRAFT READINESS
Aircraft data was requested from the Navy Maintenance
Support Office Department, Naval Sea Logistics Command,
Mechanicburg, PA. This is the depository of all Navy and
Marine Corps aircraft statistical data. The eight requested
reports cover one year each and are broken down by aircraft
type, squadron, and month. The data is summarized for type
commander (Commander Naval Air, Atlantic or Commander Naval
Air, Pacific) , force commander for Marine F-4S aircraft
(FMFLant or FMFPac) , and all Navy and Marine F-4S aircraft.
The data covers 1 January 1981 to 31 July 1988 and is
classified confidential. The standardization and
normalization process used in Chapter 6 allows the data to
be presented in an unclassified format. 1981 was picked as
the beginning of the analysis since prior years involved a
changeover from the F-4J to the F-4S aircraft for the
squadrons involved in UDP. During the changeover period,
squadrons flew and reported on two types of aircraft.
Deployments involving the F/A-18 were not included since
they began in 1987 and sufficient historical data does not
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exist. Analysis was limited to three units from MCAS
Kaneohe Bay, HI and three units from MCAS Beaufort, SC since
they were the only fighter squadrons involved in UDP during
this time period.
These reports contain a wealth of summary data. Each
annual report includes a listing of all major aircraft
status codes and the subdivisions of each code. No data is
available for approximately 33 percent of the time covered.
Late or inaccurate submissions by units are not included in
NAMSO's data base, and squadrons are not notified of
problems so that corrections or additions can be made.
C. AIRCREW TRAINING READINESS
Data was requested from the Aviation Analysis Branch
(ASA) of HQMC. ASA maintains the data base for all data on
Marine Aviation flight readiness. Due to the immense amount
of data available, the analysis is restricted to five
squadrons participating in UDP and covers 1 July 1977 to 3
June 1980. This includes two squadrons from MCAS Beaufort
which deployed to MCAS Iwakuni for one year and three
squadrons from MCAS Kaneohe Bay which deployed for six-month
increments. Approximately 51,000 records have been manually
inspected for this analysis.
Aircrew training readiness is inputed to the system
through the Flight Readiness Evaluation Data System (FREDS)
,
MAVMC Form 10958. This form includes data concerning the
aircraft, the pilot, and the radar intercept officer (RIO)
.
One form is generally filed for each flight. Information
from the form is then keypunched on two computer cards (for
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pilot and RIO) for system input. Each record has 115
characters. Included in the data are such items as aircraft
bureau number, Julian date 1 , departure time, organization
and equipment codes, arrival and departure location codes,
flight purpose code, flight time, aircrew social security
numbers, number of landings and instrument approaches, crew
mission codes, and training codes.
D. PERSONNEL RETENTION
Data for analysis of personnel retention was obtained
from the master files at HQMC. Reenlistment rates were
requested for twelve tactical F-4 squadrons. These rates
begin on 1 July 1977 and end 30 June 1980. Time periods of
91 days and 182 days were considered for analysis. The
quarterly breaks included too many sparsely populated cells
to be useful, so semi-annual breaks were chosen. The data
fields include the number of personnel eligible for
reenlistment, number ineligible for reenlistment, number
reenlisting, and the reenlistment rate. The reenlistment
rate is found by dividing the number reenlisting by the
number eligible for reenlistment.
The data covers all enlisted personnel in the squadron.
Officers are not included in the data. Aircrew have six
years of obligated service upon graduation from flight
training and normally hold a reserve status. Officers must
be augmented into the regular Marine Corps if they are to
Julian date is a four digit number. The first number
rerepresents the last number of the current year. The next three




remain beyond the initial obligated service. Enlisted
personnel serve varying terms of enlistment and then must
reenlist to remain on active duty. Those ineligible for
reenlistment include personnel retiring after 20 years of
service as well as those personnel not qualified for
reenlistment.
The all-squadron reenlistment rates are subdivided into
grade and time-in-service. For grade subdivisions, Staff
Noncommissioned Officers (SNCO, E6-E9) and junior enlisted
(sargeants and below) were chosen. SNCOs are generally
considered career-oriented and are segregated from more
junior enlisted personnel, since SNCO reenlistment rates are
considerably higher. Time-in-service is broken down in two
increments: one to five years and over five years. Because
the one to five year category captures all first term
enlistments, a lesser increment is not considered
appropriate. A larger increment will begin to approximate




V. TRANSPORTATION COST ANALYSIS
By changing UDP from a six-month rotation to a one-year
rotation, the Marine Corps can reduce transportation costs.
Under the present program, squadron aircraft are flown to
Iwakuni, Japan on every other evolution. For example, VMFA-
312 deployed to Japan in June of 1985 replacing VMFA-333.
VMFA-312 flew their F-4S aircraft from MCAS , Beaufort, SC to
Japan. Most of the enlisted personnel in the squadron were
transported by Special Assignment Airlift Mission (SAAM)
scheduled by MAC. A selected number of maintenance
personnel provide logistical support for squadron aircraft
along the route of flight. Personnel preceed the F-4S
aircraft in a Marine Corps C-9 transport aircraft and
provide aircraft recovery, refueling, and maintenance at the
next stopping point. The C-9 will take off prior to the
next launch and again preceed the F-4s. A minimum number of
personnel will remain behind, launch the F-4s, and provide
maintenance if any aircraft are forced to abort. These
maintenance personnel will follow the F-4s in a Marine Corps
C-130 cargo aircraft. After VMFA-312' s arrival, VMFA-333
aircrew flew out their aircraft, and the enlisted personnel
boarded the SAAM flight and logistical aircraft and returned
to Beaufort. Six months later VMFA-312 was replaced by
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VMFA-451. In a cost savings effort, squadron aircraft are
rotated every other deployment. This simplified the entire
evolution. VMFA-451 personnel were flown over by SAAM (Main
Body) , and VMFA-312 personnel returned via the same SAAM.
Advanced parties of 35 personnel preceeded the unit
deployments and were responsible for acceptance inspections
on the other squadron's aircraft.
Changing to one-year deployments would save the
transportation costs associated with the second deployment
evolution highlighted in the example. Appendix A depicts a
chronology of fighter squadron deployments to MCAS Iwakuni,
Japan. Periods marked by a # identify deployments that did
not involve the TransPac of aircraft. Three squadrons from
both Beaufort and Kaneohe Bay are involved in UDP rotation.
Each unit will, therefore alternate deploying with and
without their aircraft. In the previous example, VMFA-312
would deploy again in Janauary 1987 without its assigned
aircraft.
Minitab Statistical Software has been used to provide
regression models for predicting transportation costs
between US based squadrons and MCAS, Iwakuni. Appendix B
depicts transportation cost rates for main body, advanced
party, and equipment transportation provided by or
contracted through MAC [Ref. 14].
18
A. MAIN BODY
An equation for forecasting main body transportation
costs is obtained with Civilian Air Transport rates for
dedicated contracted aircraft (CAT B) as the dependent
variable. These are the rates MAC pays its commercial
airline contractors and are based on round trip schedules.
The CAT B rates are first deflated and changed to constant
1988 dollars with the use of Implicit Gross National Product
Price Deflators, Appendix C [Ref. 15]. Deflators exist
through the second quarter of calendar year 1988. The rates
for the remainder of 1988 and 1989 are estimated based on a
four quarter moving average with 0.5 percent added to
account for an apparent increase in inflation this year.
Although the estimates are rough, an 1.0 percent increase or
decrease in the estimate for 1988 and 1989 (constant 1988
dollars) causes only a $5,000 difference in the projected
Marine Corps cost savings for UDP main body transport over
the next five years. The CAT B rate is cents per available
passenger seat per statute route mile.
CAT B rates are regressed using fuel prices as the
predictor. The regression covers the period 1982 through
1988. Appendix D shows kerosene type jet fuel prices as a
yearly average from fiscal year 1982 through 1988 [Ref. 16].
These prices are for plant and gas operator sales to end
users which are made directly to the ultimate consumer
including bulk customers such as agriculture and the
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military, as well as residential and commercial customers.
The regression line depicted in Table 5.1 was developed
using the least sguares method. The line expresses the
average relationship between the independent and dependent
variables (fuel price and rate) . The least squares method
attempts to find a straight line which is close to all the
data points and minimizes the distances between individual
points and the line. The plot of CAT B RATE versus FUEL
PRICE shows a upward sloping trend between 1982 and 1988.
In order to use a regression line for forecasting, one
must make several assumptions: (1) a linear relationship
exists between the dependent and independent variables;
(2) the errors between actual observations and forecast
values based on the regression line are normally
distributed; (3) the expected errors sum to zero; (4) the
variance of errors along the regression line is constant;
and (5) error terms are independent of previous or
subsequent errors.
The upward sloping plot of CAT B RATE over FUEL PRICE
can be fitted with a straight line to satisfy the first
assumption. To determine if the regression equation is a
good fit for the actual data points, one must analyze the
standard error of the estimate, the coefficient of
correlation, and the coefficient of determination. The
standard error of the estimate tells roughly within what
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distance of the estimate the true value can be expected to
lie. The standard error of the estimate (s) is 0.1338.
TABLE 5.1
MAIN BODY TRANSPORTATION REGRESSION ANALYSIS
The regression equation is:
CAT B RATE = 4.2 + 0.0204 (FUEL PRICE)
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p
Constant 4.1967 0.1785 23.52 0.000
FUEL PRICE 0.020449 0.002117 9.66 0.000
s = 0.1338 R-sq = 94.9% R-sq(adj) = 93.9%
Analysis of Variance
Source DF SS MS F p.
93.27 0.000Regression 1 1.6700 1.6700
Error 5 0.0895 0.0179
Total 6 1.7595
Durbin-Watson statistic = 2.00
This is relatively small compared to the estimates and
indicates a good fit. For example, at a 1986 fuel price of
56.29 cents (constant 1988 dollars), the calculated CAT B
RATE is 5.35 cents per passenger per available seat. Adding
the standard error of the estimate gives a price of 5.4838
which is greater than the actual price of 5.4332. At the
estimated price, the standard error is only 2.5 percent of
the price.
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A correlation coefficient (r) of 1.0 indicates perfect
correlation between variables but is intuitively difficult
to relate to the regression equation. Its square, the
coefficient of determination (r-sq) is more useful and
describes how much of the variability in the observed
dependent variable is due to variation in the independent
variable. In this case, the r-sq means that 94.9% of the
variation in rates is due to variations in fuel price (from
one year to the next)
.
The t-ratio can be used to test the significance of the
independent variables and of the constant. For a 95%
confidence level and six total degrees of freedom (DF) , the
critical t-value is 2.447. The absolute values of the
indicated t-ratios of 23.52 and 9.66 are substantially
higher than the critical value, implying a good fit.
The F-ratio provides another excellent means of
determining the goodness of fit. Where there is only one
independent variable, the F-ratio is the square of the
t-ratio. For a 95% confidence level, one DF for the
regression, and five DFs for the error, the critical F-value
is 6.61. The F-ratio of 93.27 is significantly greater than
the critical value and a good fit exists.
A plot of the residual errors against normal scores for
the data (Minitab NSCORE routine) provides a check for
normality. The NSCORE routine transforms the residual
errors into standard normal distribution values which are
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useful in determining whether the residual errors
approximate a normal distribution. The results approximate
a straight line; therefore, normality can be assumed. The
correlation between the error terms and the normal scores is
0.972 and exceeds the critical value of approxomately 0.9
for a .05 level of significance. A plot of CAT B RATE
versus FUEL PRICE with the superimposed regression equation
indicates that constant variance exists. A plot of the
errors versus time shows that the errors have no pattern and
are random.
Autocorrelation is a problem most often encountered in
time series analysis, but it can pose a problem for
regression using independent variables other than time.
Autocorrelation can be caused by "stickiness" in reducing
costs or the relationship of time periods to previous time
periods. Each period's cost, therefore, can be partly
dependent on the prior period's cost. Determination is made
by checking error terms of each period for systematic
relationships. A method of measuring autocorrelation is
through the Durbin-Watson Statistic (D-W) . With absolutely
no correlation between errors, the value will equal 2.0.
Perfect positive correlation is indicated by a D-W of 0.0,
and perfect negative correlation is indicated by a D-W of
4.0. The critical test value depends on the number of
explanatory variables and the number of observations serving
as the basis of the regression equation. With one
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independent variable (FUEL PRICE) and six observations, the
upper limit of the critical value is less than 1.36.
Because the D-W for the regression equation is 2.00, there
is no autocorrelation.
Initial regression analysis included data from fiscal
years 1980 and 1981. The initial data plot of CAT B RATE
versus FUEL PRICE showed an abrupt decrease in the slope. A
time series plot presented the possibility that the trend
line may have changed course in 1980 and 1981. Further
investigation revealed that steep increases in crude oil
prices during this time caused the price of jet fuel to
double. This increase in variable costs was largely
absorbed by the commercial contractors, thereby distorting
the normal historical relationship between fuel prices and
transportation rates. The R-sq for the regression was
approximately 46%, showing a poor fit for the regression
line. A low D-W indicated autocorrelation was present.
As a consequence, data from 1980 and 1981 were not used in
developing the regression equation and trend line.
Before continuing the analysis, more assumptions must be
made. The first assumption is that the Marine Corps will
continue to use DC-10 aircraft to transport main body
personnel as they have over the last several years. This
aircraft is a good size for aviation units, providing
adequate seating and capability for extra baggage without
requiring more servicing stops between Beaufort, SC and
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Iwakuni, JA. The second assumption is that terminal fees
and other miscellaneous airline costs, none of which are
included in the CAT B RATE, will not become significant and
can, therefore, be excluded from the analysis. Third, the
analysis assumes that the present flight routes will remain
the same.
The next step in forecasting costs for main body
transportation requires estimating future jet fuel prices.
Table 5.2 are estimates provided by the Energy Information
Administration, Department of Energy. To be usable, the
prices per million BTU are converted to cents per gallon
using an average of 5.67 million BTU per barrel for kerosene
type jet fuel and 42 gallons per barrel. [Ref. 17]
TABLE 5.2
PROJECTED JET FUEL PRICES 1989 - 1993






The conversion factor is $0,135 million BTU per gallon.
The DC-10 cost for each evolution, home base - overseas
- home base, can now be easily computed. For the DC-10
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configuration under present MAC contracts, 354 seats are
available and will be paid for whether used or not. MAC
uses great circle mileage, rather than International Air
Transport Association (IATA) mileage charts, to figure
charges under CAT B contracts. Table 5.3 depicts the
routing and the one way distance for commercial contracts
TABLE 5.3
SPECIAL AIRLIFT MISSION ROUTING (DC-10)
Beaufort Squadrons
Route: MCAS Beaufort, SC - Anchorage Int'l Airport -
Yokoda AFB, Japan - MCAS Iwakuni, Japan -
Yokoda AFB, Japan - Anchorage Int'l Airport -
MCAS Beaufort, SC
Distance: 14,896 statute miles (one way)
El Toro Squadrons
Route: MCAS El Toro, CA - Anchorage Int'l Airport -
Yokoda AFB, Japan - MCAS Iwakuni, Japan -
Yokoda AFB, Japan - Anchorage Int'l Airport -
MCAS El Toro, CA
Distance: 12,534 statute miles (one way)
Hawaii Squadrons
Route: Hickam AFB, HI - Yokoda AFB, Japan - MCAS
Iwakuni, Japan - Yokoda AFB, Japan - Hickam
AFB, HI
Distance: 8,596 statute miles (one way)
Forecasts are developed for the next five years using the
regression equation, CAT B RATE = 4.2 + . 02 04 (PROJECTED
FUEL PRICE), and are presented in Table 5.4. This is the
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amount MAC pays the commercial carrier per passenger seat
available. The amount that MAC charges its military
customers through the Industrial Fund (tariff) has an
additional ten percent surcharge added. The costs are
projected by applying the following equation:
Projected Cost = Tariff X Statute Miles X Available Seats.
Appendix E provides a forecast of the fighter squadrons
to be involved in UDP over the next five years [Ref. 18].
This can vary and depends on the desires of the Commanding
Generals, Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific (FMFPac) and Fleet
Marine Forces, Atlantic (FMFLant) . As listed, the squadrons
exchange aircraft during January and October. The possible
cost savings can be determined by matching the results shown
in Table 5.4 with the unit deployments which do not involve
the TransPac of squadron aircraft (Appendix E)
.
TABLE 5.4
PROJECTED DC-10 SAAM COSTS FOR UDP
(Constant 1988 Dollars)
Year CAT B Tariff Beaufort El Toro Kaneohe Bay
1989 5.44 5.98 $315,336 $265,335 $181,970
1990 5.45 6.00 $316,391 $266,222 $182,579
1991 5.47 6.01 $316,918 $266,666 $182,883
1992 5.48 6.02 $317,446 $267,110 $183,188
1993 5.52 6.08 $320,610 $269,772 $185,013
CAT B and Tariff units of measure are cents per mile
per seat available.
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For example, in 1989, only a Beaufort and an El Toro
squadron will participate in UDP. In 1991, the deploying
squadrons from El Toro will be replaced by Kaneohe Bay
squadrons. Table 5.5 provides a breakdown of these possible
cost savings. If UDP is changed to a one-year deployment,
the savings for main body transport over the next five years
could exceed $2,600,000. If the projected cost savings are
discounted at five percent based on the time value of money,
the total savings will be $2,321,256. At a ten percent
discount rate, the savings will be $2,040,781.
TABLE 5.5
PROJECTED MAIN BODY TRANSPORTATION COST SAVINGS FOR UDP
FY 1989 - FY 1993
(Constant 1988 Dollars)






Total Undiscounted Cost Savings $2,669,342
TOTAL DISCOUNTED COST SAVINGS:










All squadrons deploy with a certain amount of equipment
which enables them to fulfill their missions. The majority
of the equipment consists of maintenance tools and support
gear. Since transportation of this equipment is expensive,
much of it is left in place and transferred to the arriving
unit. However, there still remains a considerable amount of
equipment that cannot be easily transferred. F-4 squadrons
were authorized transportation, via MAC C-141, of up to
55,000 pounds from home base to Iwakuni, Japan and return.
The F/A-18 community has lower support requirements and
deploys with approximately 50,000 pounds of equipment.
The tariff flying hour rates (FHR) from Appendix B are
used to determine a regression equation, depicted in Table
5.6, for forecasting future equipment transportation costs.
The independent variable or predictor is the price of
kerosene-type jet fuel, listed in Appendix D. Both TARIFF
and FUEL PRICE are deflated to constant 1988 dollars using
the GNP Implicit Price Deflators from Appendix C.
The plot of FHR TARIFF versus FUEL PRICE shows an
increasing upward sloping trend which can be fitted with a
straight line. Initial efforts at regression show a need to
transform the data for a better fit. Transforming the
horizontal or vertical scales can straighten the plots and
provide linear equivalents of a curvilinear function.
Analysis of the shape of the original data led to the
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conclusion that transformations—logarithmic, exponential,
and power—were desirable. The first involves transforming
the FUEL PRICE axis to a logarithmic scale; the second
involves transforming the CAT B RATE axis; and the third
TABLE 5.6
EQUIPMENT TRANSPORTATION REGRESSION ANALYSIS
The regression equation equation is:
FHR TARIFF = (31.9 + 0.316 (FUEL PRICE)) 2
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p
Constant 31.880 3.152 10.11 0.000
FUEL PRICE 0.31602 0.03662 8.63 0.000
s = 2.303 R-sq = 93.7% R-sq(adj) = 92.5%
Analysis of Variance
Source DF SS MS F p
74.48 0.000Regression 1 395.16 395.16
Error 5 26.53 5.31
Total 6 421.68
Durbin-Watson statistic =2.43
involves transforming both axes. Other transformations
include transforming to reciprocal or square root scales
vice logarithmic. The reciprocal is required when the trend
requires more bending to form a straight line than what
logarithmic transformation can provide. The square root is
used when less bending is required. The equation, Square
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Root Y = a + bx, is similar to a logarthimic equation,
appears to be the best fit, and is supported by the
following analysis.
The true value of C-141 FHR TARIFF should lie within
$5.30 (the square of the standard estimate of 2.303) of the
estimate. This small possible error indicates a good fit.
For example, at an actual FHR TARIFF of $655, the possible
error equates to less than one percent of the actual FHR
TARIFF. Almost 94 percent of the variation in C-141 FHR
TARIFF is due to variations in FUEL PRICE as evidenced by an
r-sq value of 93.7%. For a 95% confidence level and six
total degrees of freedom, the critical t-value is 2.447.
The absolute values of the indicated t-ratios of 10.11 and
8.63 are significantly higher than the critical value,
implying a good fit. The critical value for the F-ratio is
6.61 and is much lower than the 74.48 for the regression
equation. Again, this implies a good fit.
The residual error plot versus normal scores
approximates a straight line and normality of the errors is
assumed. The correlation coefficient between the two is
0.935 and exceeds the critical value of 0.9 for a 0.05 level
of significance. The plot of the transformed dependent
variable and the independent variable indicates that
constant variance exists. A plot of the errors versus C-141
FHR TARIFF shows that the errors have no pattern and are
independent of the variables. A times series plot of the
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residuals shows no apparent trends of the errors over time.
Autocorrelation does not exist. The D-W coefficient for
the regression is 2.43, implying that any autocorrelation
would be negative. The critical value lower limit at the
0.05 level of significance is greater than 2.64
and significantly higher than the computed value for the
regression equation.
Estimates for C-141 FHR TARIFF, as listed in Table 5.7,
are projected for 1989 to 1993, based on the regression
equation and the jet fuel prices forecasted in Table 5.2.
These tariffs are multiplied by the average C-141 flight
hours between U.S. military bases (Beaufort, El Toro, and
Kaneohe Bay) and Iwakuni, Japan to determine equipment
transportation costs. Actual cost figures for C-141
transportation for 1988 and 1989 are depicted in Appendix F.
These figures each cover one deployment evolution, to
Iwakuni and return. The actual cost figures were divided by
the actual C-141 FHR Tariffs for these two years to
determine the flying hours between the home bases and
Iwakuni. The flying hours are for round trip flights, are
averaged, and are used to forecast the cost of C-141
transportation for 1989 to 1993 as depicted in Table 5.7.
The potential cost savings for transporting equipment to
Iwakuni, Japan under a one-year UDP can be determined by
matching the results of Table 5.7 with those deployments
which do not involve the TransPac of aircraft, marked by a #
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in Appendix E. Table 5.8 shows a breakdown of the possible
cost savings. These savings could amount to almost
$1,000,000 over the next five years.
TABLE 5.7
PROJECTED EQUIPMENT TRANSPORTATION COSTS FOR UDP
(Constant 1988 Dollars)
Year C-141 FHR Tariff Beaufort El Toro Kaneohe Bay
1989 2,607 $109,103 $85,145 $78,497
1990 2,630 $110,066 $85,896 $79,189
1991 2,653 $111,028 $86,647 $79,882
1992 2,669 $111,698 $87,170 $80,364
1993 2,745 $114,878 $89,652 $82,652
For the projected savings to be valid, three assumptions
must hold. First, the average flight hour figures developed
in Appendix F must remain constant. The number of flight
hours required for equipment deployment will fluctuate based
on the winds at flight level. For example, a 12,935
nautical mile flight from Beaufort to Iwakuni and return
will take approximately 27 hours at an average airspeed of
480 nautical miles per hour. This is an overly simplistic
example and does not include the extra time required due to
slower airspeeds for takeoff, for climb to cruising
altitude, for enroute descent, and for landing. At an
average airspeed of 450 nautical miles per hour, this same
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trip will take two hours longer than at a speed of 480. The
second assumption is that the equipment requirements for
deploying F/A-18 units will remain at approximately 25 short
tons and not outgrow the lift capability of a C-141 in
weight or cube (space)
.
TABLE 5.8
PROJECTED EQUIPMENT TRANSPORTATION COST SAVINGS FOR UDP
FY 1989 - FY 1993
(Constant 1988 Dollars)
FY Beaufort El Toro Kaneohe Bay Total
1989 $109,103 $85,145 $194,248
1990 $110,066 $85,896 $195,962
1991 $111,028 $79,882 910
1992 $111,698 $80,364 $192,062
1993 $114,878 $84,652 $199,530
Total Undisc . .$972,712
5% Discount Rate 10% Discount Rate
$842,004 $737,048
The third assumption is that there will be no change in
trends for components of C-141 FHR TARIFFS other than jet
fuel prices. For 1989, the Tariff of $2,507 was determined
by MAC based on the following inputs: (1) fixed costs of
$928 which includes $118 for civilian pay, $474 for depot
maintenance, $200 for supply, and $136 for miscellaneous
costs; (2) variable costs of $1,287 based on flight hours
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which includes $1,196 for fuel, $23 for depot maintenance,
$2 6 for supply, and $4 2 for temporary duty payment to
aircrew; and (3) a premium of $292 [Ref. 19]. Since fuel
accounts for less than 50 percent of the total Tariff, any
large changes in labor, supply, or maintenance costs could
induce errors in forecasts over the next five years.
Historical figures, other than fuel inputs, were not
available for running a multiple regression analysis.
C. ADVANCED PARTY
F-4 squadrons were authorized 35 personnel on advanced
parties for deployments involving the transfer of aircraft
between squadrons. These parties consisted mainly of
maintenance personnel to perform aircraft acceptance and
transfer inspections, aircrews for acceptance flights, and
logistics and administrative personnel. F/A-18 squadrons
are now limited to 30 personnel since fewer aircrew and
maintenance personnel are required for transfer and
acceptance.
CAT Y airline rates and kerosene type jet fuel are used
to forecast advanced party transportation costs. The CAT Y
Rates are user tariffs that MAC charges military services
for transporting individual personnel one way between U.S.
civilian airports and overseas civilian airports. MAC
contracts annually with civilian carriers to provide
regularly scheduled flights and pays them by the flight
rather than the seat, thus absorbing the risk of unfilled
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flights. The seats are then made available to military and
DOD personnel at rates (CAT Y) sufficient to cover MAC'S
overhead costs, allowing for an average number of unfilled
seats, and to provide some "profit." The independent
variable for the analysis is the price of jet fuel which
appears in Appendix D. Prior to regression, the CAT Y rates
and fuel prices are converted to constant 1988 dollars using
the Implicit GNP Price Deflators, Appendix C.
Three CAT Y rates are listed in Appendix B and cover
transportation from St. Louis, MO, Los Angeles, CA, and
Honolulu, HI to Narita International Airport, Tokyo, Japan.
These rates cover personnel deploying from Beaufort, SC, El
Toro, CA, and Kaneohe Bay, HI respectively. Additional
costs are incurred by Beaufort squadrons for commercial
transportation to St. Louis. From Narita Airport, the
common mode of transportation to MCAS Iwakuni, Japan is by
train. Historical rates are not available so a train
transportation cost of 9600 yen one-way, effective on 22
October 1988, is used for analysis [Ref. 20]. The
conversion rate from yen to dollars has flucuated
drastically over the past several years. This analysis uses
the October 22, 1988 rate of 127 yen to the dollar and 9600
yen to forecast charges for the next five years. This
rounds to $7 6.00 per person for one-way transportation.
This cost is small compared to the overall transportation
costs. For 30 individuals, this totals to $2,280.
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The following analyses are based on three assumptions.
First, the Marine Corps will continue to use CAT Y flights
to transport advanced parties to and from WestPac. Second,
Beaufort personnel will continue to use commercial flights
from Savannah, GA to St. Louis, MO and then board a CAT Y
flight to Japan. Third, personnel will continue to use
train transportation from Tokyo to Iwakuni.
One must realize that the figures developed in this
section are only estimates of possible cost savings. For
example, advanced parties have deployed directly to Korea
due to runway repairs at Iwakuni and have returned to the
U.S. from the Phillippines since their units were deployed
there just prior to completing a UDP evolution. Any such
changes will result in deviations from the projected cost
savings.
1. MCAS Beaufort to MCAS Iwakuni
The CAT Y RATE, Appendix B, is regressed using FUEL
PRICE as the predictor. The plot of CAT Y RATE versus FUEL
PRICE shows an upward sloping trend which does not require
transformation prior to performing regression analysis. The
power equation, Y = a + bx provides a good fit. The results
of the regression are depicted in Table 5.9.
Analysis of the goodness of fit follows that applied
in the previous section on transportation costs.
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TABLE 5.9
ADVANCED PARTY TRANSPORTATION REGRESSION ANALYSIS
ST. LOUIS, MO - TOYKO, JAPAN
The regression equation equation is:
CAT Y RATE = 316 + 4.45 X FUEL PRICE
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p
Constant 316.01 62.91 5.02 0.007
FUEL PRICE 4.4501 0.7911 5.63 0.005
s = 39.58 R-sq = 88.8% R-sq(adj) = 86.0%
Analysis of Variance
Source DF SS MS F p
31.64 0.005Regression 1 49565 49565
Error 4 6265 1566
Total 5 55830
Durbin-Watson statistic = 2.33
The standard error of the estimate, 39.58, is acceptable and
indicates a good fit. 88.8% of the variation in rates is
due to the independent variable, FUEL PRICE. The critical
t-ratio is 2.57 with a 95% confidence interval and five
total degrees of freedom. The absolute value of the
regression t-ratios of 5.02 and 5.63 are higher and imply a
good fit. The F-ratio, 31.64, exceeds the critical value of
7.71 for a 95% confidence interval, one DF for the
regression, and four DFs for the error.
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A plot of residual errors against normal scores
approximates a straight line; therefore, normality can be
assumed. Correlation between the error terms and the normal
scores is 0.974 and exceeds the critical value of 0.9 for a
.05 level of significance. A plot of CAT Y RATE versus FUEL
PRICE with the superimposed regression line indicates that
constant variance exists. The error plots show no pattern,
and they are considered independent of the variables as
required for least squares, best fit analysis.
Table 5.10 provides estimated costs over the next five
years as determined by the regression formula, Table 5.9.
CAT Y RATES from St. Louis to Tokyo are based on projected
jet fuel prices listed in Appendix D.
TABLE 5.10
PROJECTED ADVANCED PARTY TRANSPORTATION COSTS
MCAS BEAUFORT - MCAS IWAKUNI
(Constant 1988 Dollars)
Year 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Savannah - St. Louis
St. Louis - Tokyo
Tokyo - Iwakuni
Cost Per Individual 832 835 838 841 851
Total Cost(30 People) 24,960 25,050 25,140 25,230 25,530
Beaufort squadron's advanced party personnel use
commercial airline transportation to reach St. Louis for
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170 170 170 170 170
586 589 592 595 605
76 76 76 76 76
their CAT Y flight to Narita International Airport, Tokyo,
Japan. Historical airline charges are not available between
the closest civilian airport to Beaufort (Savannah, GA) and
St. Louis; consequently, a November 1, 1988 rate of $170,
one-way, is used in this analysis. The total cost of
transporting one advanced party from Savannah to St. Louis
is $5,100.
2. MCAS El Toro - MCAS Iwakuni
The plot of CAT Y RATE, Appendix B, versus FUEL
PRICE, Appendix D shows a trend which slopes upward at a
decreasing rate. Analysis of data plots indicates that
transformation of the dependent variable, FUEL PRICE, is
required prior to performing regression. The equation,
Y = a + b* 1/x, provides a good fit. The results of the
regression are depicted in Table 5.11.
The standard error of the estimate compares
favorably to the estimates, indicating a good fit. 95.9% of
the variation in CAT Y RATE is due to the independent
variable 1/FUEL PRICE. The critical t-ratio is 2.57 and is
less than the absolute values of the regression t-ratios for
the predictors, 21.76 and -9.63. The F-ratio is 92.67 and
exceeds the critical value of 7.71.
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TABLE 5.11
ADVANCED PARTY TRANSPORTATION REGRESSION ANALYSIS
LOS ANGELES, CA - TOYKO, JAPAN
The regression equation equation is:
CAT Y RATE = 893 + 27194 (1/FUEL PRICE)
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p
Constant 892.95 41.04 21.76 0.000
1/FUEL PRICE -27194 2825 -9.63 0.001
s = 26.44 R-sq = 95.9% R-sq(adj) = 94.8%
Analysis of Variance
Source DF SS MS F p
92.67 0.001Regression 1 64756 64756
Error 4 2795 699
Total 5 67551
Durbin-Watson statistic = 1.86
A plot of residual errors over normal scores
approximates a straight line, implying normality.
Correlation between the error terms and the normal score is
0.941 and is greater than the critical value of 0.9.
Constant variance exists between the regression results and
the actual plots. The errors appear random, implying
independence and satisfies the requirements of regression.
Table 5.12 provides estimated costs over the next
five years. The regression equation from TABLE 5.11 and the
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projected jet fuel prices listed in Appendix D were used to
project CAT Y RATES from Los Angeles to Tokyo.
TABLE 5.12
PROJECTED ADVANCED PARTY TRANSPORTATION COSTS
MCAS EL TORO - MCAS IWAKUNI
(Constant 1988 Dollars)
Year 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Los Angeles - Tokyo 445 450 455 459 474
Tokyo - Iwakuni 76 76 76 76 76
Cost Per Individual 521 526 531 535 550
Total Cost(30 People) 15,630 15,780 15,930 16,050 16,500
3 . MCAS Kaneohe Bay - MCAS Iwakuni
The plot of CAT Y RATE, Appendix B, versus FUEL
PRICE, Appendix D shows an upward sloping trend. The plot
approximates a straight line indicating transformationof
variables is not required. The equation, Y = a + b * X is
appropriate. Regression analysis, Table 5.13, shows an
almost perfect fit.
A very small standard error of the estimate, 2.761,
indicates a good fit of the regression line. 99.4 % of the
variance in CAT Y RATE is due to the independent variable,
FUEL PRICE. The t-ratios of 53.56 and 26.41 are
significantly greater than the critical ratio of 2.57. An
F-ratio of 697.4 exceeds the critical value of 7.71. Both
ratios imply a good fit.
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TABLE 5.13
ADVANCED PARTY TRANSPORTATION REGRESSION ANALYSIS
HONOLULU, HI - TOYKO, JAPAN
The regression equation equation is:
CAT Y RATE = 235 + 1.46 (FUEL PRICE)
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p
Constant 235.005 4.388 53.56 0.000
FUEL PRICE 1.45734 0.05518 26.41 0.000
s = 2.761 R-sq = 99.4% R-sq(adj) = 99.3%
Analysis of Variance
Source DF SS MS F p
Regression 1 5315.5 5315.5 697.4 0.000
Error 4 30.5 7.6
Total 5 5346.0
Durbin-Watson statistic = 2.01
A plot of residual errors against normal scores
shows a straight line and normality is assumed. Correlation
between the two is extremely high at 0.97 and exceeds the
critical value of 0.9. Very little variance exists so it is
assumed to be constant. No pattern is depicted in the error
plot and they are considered independent of the variables.
Projected jet fuel prices from Appendix D are used
to project CAT Y rates. Table 5.14 provides a summary of
projected transportation costs between Honolulu and Iwakuni.
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TABLE 5.14
PROJECTED ADVANCED PARTY TRANSPORTATION COSTS
MCAS KANEOHE BAY - MCAS IWAKUNI
(Constant 1988 Dollars)
Year 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Honolulu - Tokyo 323 324 326 326 330
Tokyo - Iwakuni 76 76 76 76 76
Cost Per Individual 399 400 402 402 406
Total Cost(30 People) 11 . 970 12,000 12,060 12,060 12,180
4 . Aggregate Costs
Table 5.15 depicts projected overall transportation
cost savings for UDP advanced parties. These costs are
determined by crossing the advanced party costs from Tables
5.10, 5.12, and 5.14 with the UDP deployment projections
from Appendix E.
D. TRANSPORTATION COST SUMMARY
Table 5.16 is a recap of all the projected
transportation costs for UDP. The figures are summed from
Table 5.5, 5.8, and 5.15. By changing fighter squadron UDP
from a series of six-month deployments to one-year
deployments, the Marine Corps has the potential to save over




PROJECTED UDP ADVANCED PARTY TRANSPORTATION COST SAVINGS
FY 1989 - FY 1993
(Constant 1988 Dollars)
FY Beaufort El Toro Kaneohe Bav Total
1989 $49,920 $31,260 $ 81,180
1990 $50,100 $31,560 $ 81,660
1991 $50,280 $24,120 $ 74,400
1992 $50,460 $24,120 $ 74,580







PROJECTED UDP TRANSPORTATION COST SAVINGS
FY 1989 - FY 1993
(Constant 1988 Dollars)






Total Undiscounted Cost Savings $4,029,294










One of the underlying reasons for beginning UDP was to
increase unit readiness. Aircraft readiness is a function
of overall unit readiness. Whether or not aircraft
readiness has increased since UDP began is beyond the scope
of this thesis. What is considered is whether a change in
the current six-month deployment concept to a one-year
evolution will sacrifice aircraft readiness. There is no
sure method of quantifying readiness between the two
alternatives, but an analysis of the present program will
provide an indication whether to accept or reject the
alternative based on aircraft readiness.
The author's personal experience in UDP as a squadron
maintenance officer and as an executive officer leads to the
conclusion that the maintenance effort will be about average
until just prior to deployment (two weeks or so) . During
the deployment period, aircraft readiness will be higher
than the readiness normally maintained in the squadron.
Following the deployment, there will be a let down in
readiness due to leave periods and due to a relaxing of
operational tempo and maintenance requirements.
Aircraft readiness is difficult to measure accurately.
Readiness is a judgment call rather than simply a
quantitative measurement. For example, when an baseball
player says he is "ready" to play, his feeling comes from
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within and is made up of many variables. Certainly past
performance is one. How many hits did he have in the last
week? How many errors? Readiness in this case also depends
on the amount of recent rest and nutrition, the baseball
player's attitude, the state of his equipment, and any
problems relating to injuries. Since this judgment makes
readiness difficult to standardize, it must be broken down
and explained by performance measurements. Measurements of
readiness and the importance an individual places on each
measure varies with experience level and background. We
could look at the slugging percentage, the number of home
runs or runs batted in rather than the baseball player's
batting average. How do we weigh hits versus errors?
In addition "gaming" becomes a problem. Gaming is the
ability to manipulate the measurement to support or reach a
particular goal. If a baseball player gets paid for having
a lot of home runs, he can do several things to try to
inflate that figure. Not taking walks or accepting many
stikeouts as a result of swinging for the fence are two
examples.
The same problems occur in trying to measure aircraft
readiness. Many different measures of readiness have been
used to rate fighter squadrons. Flight hours, sorties,
Mission Capable (MC) rates, Full Mission Capable (FMC)
rates, and aircraft utilization rates are but a few.
Appendix G provides an explanation a various readiness
terminologies used in this section [Ref. 21]. Many
variables are not easily quantified, so they are not used.
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Maintenance training is difficult to quantify, but it is an
important ingredient in readiness. An aircraft may be
signed off as FMC, but it may not be properly repaired
because of lack of experience and poor supervision.
Aircraft readiness measures are subject to gaming by
those involved. Aircraft readiness is used by all echelons
as an unofficial report card on maintenance officers and on
squadron, group, wing, and force commanders. Flight hours
can be increased by adding three external fuel tanks and
flying maximum endurance airspeed. Of course, aircrew
training suffers. By flying at high airspeeds and using
high-speed refueling pits, a squadron can increase the
number of sorties it flys in a given time period. Aircrew
training may not suffer but maintenance of the aircraft
probably will. MC, FMC, PMC, etc. are computed from
squadron documents and are difficult to check for accuracy
or authenticity. Squadrons often fly aircraft away from
home base on weekends to generate flight time without
forcing the Maintenance Department to work. If the aircraft
return during non-working hours, the discrepancies written
on the aircraft are often post-dated to the time Maintenance
returns to work. This makes FMC, MC, and PMC look
artificially higher.
Many different measures of aircraft readiness were
considered for analysis. Not Mission Capable, Maintenance
(NMCM) was chosen. NMCM is that percentage of Equipment In
Service (EIS) hours in which an aircraft is Not Mission
Capable (NMC) due to unscheduled maintenance requirements.
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EIS is computed by multiplying the number of aircraft
assigned to the squadron and in a reportable status by the
number of hours in a month.
The reason for choosing NMCM was to limit the gaming
possibilities and to isolate the measure to maintenance at
the squadron level. NMC status, basically, is assigned to
aircraft that are unable to fly without endangering the
aircraft or aircrew. An NMC aircraft can't be used to
perform any mission. This is one status that maintenance
personnel and aircrew refuse to compromise and is,
therefore, subject to less gaming. No statistic is worth
intentionally risking man or machine. NMC is determined by
maintenance and supply requirements. NMCM, as a subdivision
of NMC, isolates supply from the aircraft status and is a
good indicator of aircraft readiness due to squadron
maintenance efforts.
The NMCM rates analyzed were recorded for six squadrons
based at Kaneohe Bay, HI and Beaufort, SC, and cover the
period 1 January 1981 to 31 July 1988. NMCM varies
considerably between squadrons and between time periods.
Each squadron commander or aircraft maintenance officer
places different emphasis on how high a MNCM rate he is
willing to tolerate. Maintenance personnel sometimes work
long hours to keep squadron aircraft in a high state of
readiness. Maintenance officers are notorious for trying to
place the onus on supply when aircraft are non-flyable. The
number and quality of maintenance personnel are key factors
in NMCM percentages, vary between squadrons, and are
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dependent on transfers in and out of the units.
Due to the variance among squadrons and over time, the
NMCM percentages are standardized. First, the mean and the
standard deviation are computed for each calendar year.
Then, the mean is subtracted from the monthly NMCM
percentage, and the result is divided by the standard
deviation. This figure measures the NMCM percentage
distance from the mean as a number of standard deviations
and is often called a z-score. Approximately 68 percent of
the value in a normal population lie within one standard
deviation of the mean, approximately 95 percent lie within
two standard deviations, and approxomately 99.7 percent lie
within three standard deviations.
Standardization is based on the assumption of normality.
Twelve of the 48 populations have been checked for
approximate normality. The results indicate that the
assumption of normality is reasonable. Three empirical
rules are used as the check for normality. The probability
that a single observation falls within plus or minus one
standard deviation of the mean should be 68 percent.
Another way to say this is that 68 percent of all the
observations should be within one standard deviation. The
standard deviation of the number falling inside this
interval is equal to the square root of the number times the
probability times one minus the probability. This equals
0.47 times the square root of the number of observations.
To be within three standard deviations means to be within
1.47 times the square root of the number. The rule of thumb
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is that if the number in the interval differs from . 68n by
more than 1.41(sqrt n) , the assumption of normality is
suspect. The last two checks are similar and deal with two
standard deviation intervals and three standard deviation
intervals. For example, VMFA-312 averaged an NMCM of 23.1
percent in 1981 with a standard deviation of 5.5. Ten
observations occurred during the year. Seven of these
observations are within one standard deviation. So, for
normality to hold, the following checks apply:
1 StDev: 7 - 0.680(10) < 1.41(sqrtl0)
0.20 < 4.46
2 StDev: 10 - 0.950(10) < 0.65(sqrtl0)
0.50 < 2.07
3 StDev: 10 - 0.997(10) < 0.16(sqrtl0)
0.03 < 0.52
The next procedure in the analysis involves
normalization of the data. The years are converted to time
period intervals. January 1981 is time period one and July
1988 is time period 90. The data for the six squadrons is
lagged so that deployment begins in time period 16 for all
squadrons. This eases the process of analyzing any trends
that might be caused by deployment. VMFA-312 deployed in
January 1981. The idea is to match all the other squadron
deployments in a vertical alignment to make analysis
simpler. VMFA-312 is lagged fifteen periods. VMFA-212
deployed in April 1981 so their data is lagged twelve time
periods. VMFA-451 is next with a nine period lag followed
by VMFA-232 (six month lag) , VMFA-333 (three month lag) and
VMFA-235 (no lag) . This places all squadrons deploying for
six periods beginning at time periods 16, 34, 52, 70, and
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88. However, one problem still remains. The five resulting
deployment intervals are mixed; in each interval, three
squadrons transfer aircraft and three squadrons fly their
aircraft from home base to MCAS Iwakuni. Experience leads
the author to believe that maintenance efforts might not be
equally weighted. That is to say that maintenance tends to
slide on aircraft that are being transferred while the
maintenance effort is more consistent on aircraft that are
being kept. As a result, three squadrons were lagged from
time period 16 to time period 34 which finally matches all
six squadron's deployment cycles. The results of the
standardization and normalization process appear in Table
6.1. The six month deployment is bracketed top and bottom
by bold characters.
No pattern is apparent in the magnitude of the z-scores.
The distribution of values greater than plus or minus one
standard deviation appears random. However, if one looks
merely at how each period fares in relation to the norm, a
pattern emerges. Any z-score in Table 6.1 with a minus sign
portrays better than average aircraft readiness, and z-
scores without a sign portray worse than average
performance. In the three months preceeding UDP, better
than average NMCM occurs for 51 percent of the periods for
which data is available. A breakdown by period is presented
in Table 6.2. During the squadron deployment, better than
average NMCM occurs 67.4 percent of the periods. For the
three months following deployment, better than average NMCM
occurs 34.9 percent of the periods.
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TABLE 6.1
F-4 NOT MISSION CAPAPABLE MAINTENANCE RATES
(Normalized and Standardized)
DEPLOYMENT PERIOD 1; NO AIRCRAFT TRANSFER
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
VMFA-312
VMFA-333
VMFA-451 0.2 -1.1 0.9 0.8
VMFA-235 -0.1 -0.7 -0.9 -0.3 -0.3 -0.9 -0.8 -0.6 0.4 2.0 1.8 0.4
VMFA-212 0.4 0.3 0.0 -2.5 -0.3 0.2 0.1
VMFA-232 1.1
DEPLOYMENT PERIOD 2; AIRCRAFT TRANSFER
31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42
VMFA-312 -1.4 -0.7 1.0 -1.1 0.4 -0.7 0.7 -0.3
VMFA-333 0.7 -1.2 -1.0 -0.6 -0.7 1.5
VMFA-451 1.1 -0.3 1.1 2.2 0.7 -1.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 0.6 -0.9
VMFA-235 0.9 -0.1 -2.5 -0.8 0.0 0.5 2.3 -0.3 -0.4
VMFA-212 -0.8 0.8 -1.2 -0.4 -1.4 0.0 2.0 0.9 -0.2 -0.5 -0.3 -0.9
VMFA-232 0.8 -0.5 -1.9 -1.3 1.5 -0.5 0.3 0.8 1.5 0.7
DEPLOYMENT PERIOD 3; NO AIRCRAFT TRANSFER
49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60
VMFA-312 -2.0 0.5 -0.1 0.7 1.1 2.0 0.1 -1.0 -1.1
VMFA-333 0.1 0.5 -0.1 0.3 -2.8 -0.8 -0.2 2.4
VMFA-451 0.1 -0.8 -1.3 0.3 -0.3 0.1 1.5 -0.2 1.0
VMFA-235 0.2 0.7 -0.6 -1.1 -1.5 0.0 0.6 0.4 1.7
VNFA-212 -0.1 -1.0 -0.2 0.0 -1.0 0.0 -0.5 -0.2 0.3 2.6
VMFA-232 -2.0 1.9 0.5 -0.6 -0.2 1.1 0.6 -0.3 -0.7 0.3 -0.3 1.4
************************* *******+*****! *********************
DEPLOYMENT PERIOD 4; AIRCRAFT TRANSFER
67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78
VMFA-312 -0.3 -0.2 0.2 -1.4 0.0 -0.4 -0.3 -0.1 0.0 2.4
VMFA-333 -1.7 0.5 0.7 -1.3 0.0 0.1 0.6 -2.4 0.4 0.5 0.9
VMFA-451 -1.0 1.2 -0.7 0.9 0.4 -0.2 -1.4
VMFA-235 0.7 0.6 2.1 -0.6 -0.8 0.0
VMFA-212 0.2 0.3 -0.1 -1.1 -1.1 -1.3 -1.3 -0.6 -0.7 0.8 0.5 1.4
VMFA-232 0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -1.4 -0.2 -0.2
A************************************- *********************
DEPLOYMENT PERIOD 5; NO AIRCRAFT TRANSFER
85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96
VMFA-312 0.4 0.2 -0.6 1.5 -0.6 0.7 0.1 1.5 2.0 0.5 0.2
VMFA-333 0.7 -0.6 -0.6 -1.3 -0.5 -0.3 -1.2 -0.5 0.0
VMFA-451
VMFA-235 0.9 -0.1 -0.5 -1.9 -0.5 -1.5
VMFA-212 1.5 1.2 0.6 -0.1 -1.2 0.1 -0.5 -1.1 -1.1 1.0
VMFA-232 -0.5 -0.8 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.6 -0.7 0.0 0.5 2.7 1.8
************************************** *********************
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These results confirm the author's experience but cannot
be considered conclusive. The number of gaps in the data,
the few squadrons involved in UDP, and the compressed time
frame present the possibility of reaching conclusions that
are untrue. However, in the absence of better data to judge
the benefits that accrue to aircraft readiness, this
analysis does serve to reinforce the author's judgment.
TABLE 6.2
PERCENT OF MONTHS IN WHICH MAINTENANCE
(MEASURED BY NMCM) IS ABOVE AVERAGE
FOR ALL SQUADRONS
(January 1981 - July 1988)
3 Mos Prior 6 Mo Deployment 6 Mos After
Deployment 1 50.0% 70.0% 12.5%
Deployment 2 58.0% 57.0% 63.0%
Deployment 3 47.0% 62.0% 38.0%
Deployment 4 47.0% 77.0% 36.0%
Deployment 5 53 . 0% 71.0% 25.0%
Average 51.0% 67.4% 34.9%
Note: Average is computed for each time segment (eg. for
3 months prior over all squadrons, etc.).
How does changing from two six-month deployments to a
one-year evolution affect aircraft readiness? In comparing
the two alternatives, one is concerned with total time.
Under both alternatives, squadrons will deploy for a total
of 12 months. According to Table 6.2, eight of those months
should have better than average NMCM percentages, assuming
that the maintenance effort will be as consistent for a 12
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month deployment as it is for two 6 month deployments. If
we consider NMCM over specified periods prior to and after
deployment, we will have to consider twice as many months
for six-month UDP as we would for one-year UDP. Changing to
one-year UDP will have no effect on NMCM for the three-month
periods prior to deployment, if NMCM is above the average
for half of the time and below for the remainder. According
to Table 6.2, two-thirds of the months following UDP will
have worse than average NMCM. Since half as many
deployments will take place under one-year UDP, the number
of months that NMCM is below the norm should decrease. Six-
month UDP squadrons should have eight worse than average
months subsequent to deployment, and one-year UDP squadrons
should have only four worse than average months. Therefore,
by selecting the alternative UDP, the fighter community
should see an overall decrease in NMCM percentage and an
increase in aircraft readiness.
B. AIRCREW TRAINING READINESS
Aircrew training readiness is another important
component of overall unit readiness. UDP was envisioned to
provide unit continuity, thereby, enabling commanders to
organize and control their training evolutions more
effectively. The result hoped for is increased readiness.
Whether or not this goal has been achieved in the fighter
community is not the purpose of this discussion. Again,
consideration is given to whether a change in the unit
deployment program will effect aircrew training readiness.
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Aircrew training readiness depends on many factors.
Some of the more important factors include the number and
material condition of squadron aircraft, the number of
sorties flown during a typical month, the number of aircrew
assigned to the squadron, the previous experience level of
the aircrew, aircrew time in service, the quality of
lectures provided the aircrew, the expertise of the
squadron's aircrew training section, and the emphasis that
the various echelons of command place on aircrew training.
The Marine Corps' Training and Readiness Manual (T&R)
provides guidelines for the conduct of training for aviation
communities. The T&R provides a specific syllabus for each
community. This syllabus is divided into four categories:
combat capable, combat ready, combat qualified, and full-
combat qualified. Each syllabus flight requirement in the
T&R has a combat readiness percentage (CRP) assigned. The
categories are made up of different types of sorties. The
F-4 community will fly instrument, intercept, bombing, low
level navigation, and air combat manuvering sorties, among
others. The difference between categories lies in the
degree of expertise required to complete each sortie. As
aircrew progress through the syllabus, their CRP increases.
When they complete the first portion of the syllabus, which
equates to a CRP of 60 percent, they are considered combat
capable. Seventy percent is required for combat ready, 85
percent for combat qualified, and 100 percent for full-
combat qualified. [Ref. 22]
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CRP measures total proficiency for each aircrewman.
Proficiency is a measure of achievement of a specific skill
by an individual. The need to perform aviation skills with
a degree of frequency is required to maintain a minimum
level of proficiency. This means that certain sorties
specified in the T&R syllabus must be reflown within a
specified time period; if not, CRP decreases. When aicrew
refly a syllabus sortie, they are credited with a refresher
sortie. Refresher sorties may be flown as often as desired.
For example, instrument navigation flight 104 may be flown
on five successive days or during five successive months.
The aircrew will be credited for one syllabus completion and
four refresher sorties. Only the syllabus completion will
update the aircrew's CRPs. If the refly requirement is
every three months, the aircrew will not lose the CRP
corresponding to INST 104 until the first day of the fourth
month following the last refresher sortie.
CRP is maintained for all aircrew assigned to fly with
the squadron. The CRPs for all aircrew are averaged every
month and used as an input for overall squadron readiness.
Historical files on squadron CRP are not maintained, as a
general rule, past one year. There is also no Marine Corps
requirement to maintain aircrew historical CRPs; only a
current monthly CRP is required. As a consequence, CRP
cannot be used as a measure of aircrew training readiness
for the two alternatives being analyzed for UDP. The only
information available on a long term basis is the number of
sorties flown by each aircrew.
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Each sortie is recorded on a FREDS as indicated in
Chapter IV. The FREDS list the crew mission and training
code for each flight. The training code corresponds to a
T&R syllabus sortie and is used to update CRPs. Mission
codes are divided into seven categories which equate to
syllabus completions/incompletions, refresher sorties,
evaluation flights, instructor training, test and ferry
flights, logistics and operations support, and
administrative support.
The two alternative programs are analyzed by comparing
the aircrew training accomplished by two squadrons involved
in UDP for a one-year period to three squadrons
participating in UDP for six-month increments. Since
historical CRPs are not available, mission codes are used as
a measure of aircrew training readiness for this analysis.
The aircrew training mission codes for the five squadrons
involved in UDP between October 1977 and July 1980 have been
divided into four groups of mission codes: syllabus
completions, refreshers, others, and syllabus incompletions
.
The results of the data search are recapped in Appendix H.
The four groups of mission codes are displayed on a monthly
basis. WestPac deployment time periods are highlighted
along with unit deployments to MCAS Yuma, AZ . Yuma is
included since it is a major training resource center; the
number of sorties flown and the training accomplished there
are considerably higher. Since each sortie requires a pilot
and a RIO, the number of sorties can be determined from the
mission code totals (mission code totals divided by two)
.
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Aircrew receive valuable training every time they fly,
whether they gain a syllabus completion, a refresher, or a
logistics support flight. Even a flight for which a
syllabus incompletion is recorded provides some training for
the aircrew. However, the amount of training received for a
syllabus completion does not equate to the amount of
training accomplished on a logistics support flight. As a
consequence, the mission code categories are weighted to
provide a better indication of overall training
accomplished. Multiple syllabus completions on individual
flights are not considered in the analysis since they are
not broken out by mission code. Based on the experience of
the author as an instructor in the training squadron for
Marine F-4 aircrew (VMFAT-101) , as a graduate of the Navy
Fighter Weapons School (TOPGUN) , as the Aircrew Training
Officer in a tactical squadron, and as an instructor in
Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron - One (MAWTS-
1) , the following weights indicated in Table 6.3 are
assigned to mission codes.
The aircrew mission code totals in Appendix H are
multiplied by the weights assigned in Table 6.3 to obtain
weighted totals. The results are presented in Appendix I.
For comparison purposes between one-year UDP and six-
month UDP, the totals in Appendix I are converted to a
percent difference from the mean. The results are shown in
Table 6.4. The mean applies to the 3 2 or 3 3 month periods
for each squadron. An attempt to develop an aggregated mean
for the squadron as a whole is not made due to differences
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in aircraft availability between units and due to the







Note: Other includes evaluation, instructor training, test
and ferry, logistics and operations, and administrative
codes.
Gaming is quite easy to accomplish. Aircrew log their
own training on FREDS and often take completions without
performing all the requirements. Training officers have
also been known to adopt the policy: "fly what you want, log
what you need." Some squadrons place more emphasis on
syllabus completions than on refreshers. They can make the
syllabus completions high by allowing currency for a
particular syllabus flight to lapse and then quickly
scheduling that syllabus reguirement for a flight. One of
the squadrons analyzed has a 16-month period when the
average number of refresher sorties recorded in any month
was less than three.
Some aircrew training officers are reluctant to allow
incompletions to be recorded. During a 12-month period, one
of the squadrons went nine months without a single
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TABLE 6.4
WEIGHTED AIRCREW MISSION CODE TOTALS
AS A PERCENT DIFFERENCE FROM THE MEAN
OCTOBER 1977 - JUNE 1980
1 2 3 4
Periods
























11 16 -20 2 -4 -31
84 75 -35 -23 -41 -18
68 -33 -37 -26 -28 11























VMFA-2 3 5 14 16 87 104 8 10 7 12 -12
VMFA-212 22 -56 -47 -19 -11 12 -4 -15
VMFA-2 3 2 8 -47 -46 4 49 -15 -5 12 -24


























2 22 6 7 10 -14 -34 -31
3 -38 -5 20 -16 -5 32 14
7 5 -18 -15 1 5 177 11
28 29 30 31 32 33
VMFA-251
VMFA-12 2
-13 15 15 45 -24




-58 -54 -31 -1 13 -4
52 63 -2 -18 20 -12
-28 -43 -46 -44 70
NOTES: 1. Periods are one month long.
2. Bold characters indicate UDP periods.
3. Bold and underlined characters indicate squadron
deployed to MCAS Yuma, AZ during the period.
4. The means are based on 32 months for VMFA-251
and VMFA-12 2 and 3 3 months for VMFA-23 5, VMFA-212,
and VMFA-23 2.
5. See Appendix H and Appendix I for further
breakdowns. Refresher sorties were flown each
month.
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incomplete sortie. Deciding what constitutes a support
flight or a ferry flight is often difficult. Most squadrons
attempt to log syllabus completions or refreshers vice
support codes. For example, if the MAG tasked the squadron
to fly documents from Iwakuni to Okinawa, a squadron might
log a refresher sortie for instrument/navigation instead of
logging a logistics support flight. One squadron evidently
was over tasked with outside requirements or did not place
the emphasis on matching syllabus requirements with the
other missions. Their average was almost three times the
norm for support missions.
There are many ways to analyze the results depicted in
Table 6.4. The basic method used is to compare the results
of the two one-year deployment squadrons (VMFA-251 and
VMFA-122 (Beaufort) ) to the six-month squadrons (Hawaii)
.
The training accomplished by the Beaufort squadrons is
better than their averages for 68 percent of their UDP time.
For the Hawaii squadrons, the figure is 59 percent. This
leads the author to believe that one-year UDP might be
better for aircrew training than six-month UDP.
Another way to look at the differences between
alternative programs appears in Table 6.5. The average
weighted totals for UDP and non-deployed months are found by
adding all the mission code totals for periods in which the
squadrons were deployed to WestPac and non-deployed periods,
respectively (Appendix I) . The indices are determined by
dividing these totals by the over-all averages shown in
Appendix I. For Beaufort (one-year UDP), the 113 percent
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index means that the squadrons accomplish 13 percent more
training monthly than their average over deployed and non-
deployed periods (excluding Yuma deployments) . The other
numbers have similar intrepretations. Table 6.5 shows,
therefore, that the one-year UDP squadrons accomplish more
of their training while deployed to WestPac than the six-
month UDP units on their deployments (113% vice 106%)
.
This, again, supports the author's judgement that one-year





Average Weighted Totals 1457 1826
UDP Periods:
Average Weighted Deployed 1650 193 3
Index (Percent of Total) 113% 106%
Non-deployed Periods:
Average Weighted Non-deployed 1216 1580
Index (Percent of Total) 83% 87%
The fact that the results in the previous two paragraphs
indicate aircrew training is better for one-year deployments
than six-month deployments does not necessarily imply that
the same would be true for future deployments. The F-4 has
been replaced by the F/A-18. The training syllabus for the
F/A-18 is different, the aircraft readiness is higher, and
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there are fewer total aircrew (one seat vice two seat)
.
However, additional benefits may be accrued from a one-year
UDP. When one analyzes the data mission code by mission
code, these additional benefits become apparent. First,
acceptance inspection flights are required for deployments
in which aircraft are transferred. On the average, this
requires two flights per aircraft (24 sorties) before the
squadron is satisfied with the material condition of the
newly accepted aircraft. Second, shortly after arrival at
Iwakuni, aircrew are subjected to local area familiarization
(FAM) flights. Each aircrewman is required to fly two of
these on the average (average of 32 per squadron per
deployment) . A one-year UDP, by reducing the number of
deployments, should cut in half the number of FAM flights.
Lastly, slow changes in circadian rhythm2 are a problem
for aircrew who fly non-stop directly to Iwakuni. For
Hawaii aircrew, two days of standdown is required before the
daily flight schedule may begin. For Beaufort squadrons,
the required time is five days. These requirements were
developed to overcome aircrew safety problems that can occur
from lack of rest and stress due to jet lag. When Beaufort
squadrons fly their aircraft to WestPac, the evolution takes
as much as one week. The body adapts gradually to time zone
changes while enroute, and there is no standdown requirement
upon arrival. Generally, two days of welcome aboard
lectures take place after arrival. Beaufort squadrons could
2 Regular metabolic, glandular, and sleep patterns associated
with the 24 hour cycles of the Earth's rotation.
64
fly three additional days during their deployments. For a
conservative flight schedule of twelve sorties per day, this
equates to 36 additional sorties.
Overall, changing to a one-year UDP can increase the
aircrew training capabilities for the involved squadrons.
The one-year deployments may accomplish more training while
in WestPac as a percentage of overall training. As many as
138 additional sorties can be flown each year if the
requirements for area FAM, aircraft acceptance inspection,
and standdown time are no longer required. At the least, it
appears that aircrew training readiness will not suffer if
UDP is changed from the current six-month periods to a one-
year evolution.
C. PERSONNEL RETENTION
One of the primary reasons for adopting the six-month
UDP was to increase individual and unit morale. Morale is a
mental, emotional, and spiritual state. Webster 1 s
Dictionary defines it as a "moral or mental condition with
respect to courage, discipline, confidence, enthusiasm,
willingness to endure hardship, etc. within a group, in
relation to a group, or within an individual." Morale
depends on the command climate set by leadership and the
feeling of well-being experienced by each individual. This
well-being is made up of many factors, with family being one
of the most important.
According to a study on overseas dependents conducted by
the Army:
A deployment experience of six months' duration will
enhance morale by providing new and unique training
opportunities, new surroundings and training areas, a
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feeling of cohesiveness based on a shared common
experience, the opportunity to travel in distant lands,
and the overall feeling of mission accomplishment. During
the separation there was a shift in attitudes on the part
of wives regarding the Army. Prior to the deployment the
majority of wives reported very positive attitudes....
During the deployment there was a general shift in these
attitudes from positive to neutral. ...following the
deployment, officers' and NCOs ' wives' attitudes shifted
from positive to neutral; however, the wives of junior
enlisted (E5 and below) shifted from positive to negative.
The Marine Corps switched to UDP to decrease the length
of continuous family separation (not the total amount) and
to gain unit cohesiveness, both of which should have
increased morale. As someone who has experienced WestPac
deployment prior to and during UDP, this author's opinion
is that morale has increased. How would a change to one-
year unit deployments affect morale? Having recently
experienced two six-month deployments, first as the Aircraft
Maintenance Officer and then as the Executive Officer, this
author feels that morale might improve with a change in
programs but would certainly not decrease.
Investigation of FREDS data from FY 1977 through FY 1979
revealed no appreciable difference in the total deployed
time between one-year UDP squadrons and six-month UDP
squadrons. Each of the five units investigated spent
approximately 39 percent of its time deployed. The normal
tour length in fighter squadrons is three years. During
this normal tour, personnel can expect to spend one year
overseas. If personnel remain in squadrons longer than
three years, they become susceptible to more than two unit
deployments under the current program. Almost 50 percent of
the Staff Non-commissioned Officers (SNCO) in the author's
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former unit completed three unit deployments to WestPac.
One master sargeant completed four tours to WestPac. Under
a one-year UDP, the prospect of spending more than one year
in WestPac should be less than under the six-month UDP.
To analyze morale more objectively, one needs a method
to measure it. This is difficult, to say the least.
Indicators of morale might include divorce rates, family
service center counselling, substance abuse, and retention.
Of these, the easiest to measure is retention. For this
analysis, retention is assumed to be, and is used, as an
indicator of morale. If morale is low, retention should be
lower than normal and visa versa. Although there is
certainly a positive correlation between retention and
morale, other independent variables affect retention and can
skew the measurements. One excellent example is the
economy. As the economy suffers and jobs become harder to
find, the reenlistment rates in the military services
increase. Personnel may also be enticed into reenlistment
to provide financial security if the family is suffering
debt problems.
Retention figures can be broken down in many ways over
several different periods. The analysis of retention and
reenlistment figures does not consider officers. They do
not reenlist; they are augmented to, or extended on, active
duty as reservists. Only enlisted personnel are considered
in the analysis of retention. A difficult guestion is how
to look at the reenlistment data. One can consider all
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personnel or break reenlistment down by grade or time-in-
service or both.
The normal break for grade is between E5 (Sgt) and E6
(Staff Sgt) . Once a person becomes a Staff Sargeant, he/she
is consider career-oriented. Promotion to Staff Sargeant
normally occurs sometime after the sixth year, depending on
military occupational specialty (MOS) . A look at
reenlistment rates for E5 and below may not be as good in
indicator of morale as other categories. The majority of
these personnel are on their first enlistment.
Determination not to reenlist may have nothing to do with
morale. A lot of personnel in this category are in for a
chance to "see the world" and have no intention of
reenlisting. Others have little alternative. Family
problems, financial hardships, a lackluster economy, and
outside job scarcity may induce personnel to reenlist even
when their morale is low. Such cases could lead to
discipline problems or substance abuse.
Reenlistment rates at the E6 to E9 (SNCO) level may be a
better indicator of morale than for El to E5. SNCOs have
several years invested in the Marine Corps and have made
their career decisions. The closer they get to the twenty
year retirement mark, the more likely they are to remain on
active duty. Low morale may be something they can weather
for a few months or years in order to finish their twenty
years. If the renlistment rates for SNCOs go down, morale
is probably poor and is likely to be the primary factor in a
low reenlistment rate.
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Breaking down reenlistment rates by time-in-service is
more subjective than by grade. Individuals reenlist for
different time periods and are promoted based on grade
openings in their MOS. The decision to remain past the
first or second reenlistment is essentially a career
decision and is based on the individual's likelihood of
promotion to staff sargeant. Promotion is based on the
needs of each occupational field. For example, an
electrician may have six years in grade as an E5 when
selected for E6; whereas, an ordnanceman could be selected
for E6 with only four years as an E5. Would a good break
occur at five years or six years? There is no clear answer.
The difficulty of establishing a break based on time-in-
service and the fact that SNCO reenlistment rates are higher
than the rate for all enlistees leads the author to conclude
that reenlistment rates for SNCOs is the best retention
indicator of morale. This analysis includes the overall
squadron reenlistment rates and SNCO reenlistment rates so
that the reader can compare the two.
For personnel to deploy under UDP, they must be able to
complete the deployment and have at least ten days remaining
on their enlistment contract when they return.
Consequently, the potential exists for personnel to say they
will not reenlist and to be transferred to a non-deploying
unit, only to "change" their mind after their old unit
deploys. However, personnel other than first term Marines
are not considered eligible for reenlistment if they choose
to leave the squadron based on expiration of enlistment.
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HQMC's goal is to stabilize units 60 days prior to
deployment. If an individual's enlistment contract expires
during the deployment period, he/she is transferred early
and does not count adversely toward the squadron's
reenlistment rate. This causes the squadron's rate to look
better than it should. To provide a truer picture of
retention, the reenlistment rates analyzed in this section
reflect all the personnel who were eligible but who did not
reenlist in order to deploy.
This section compares the retention rates of squadrons
deploying for six months to the rates of those deploying for
one year. The analysis looks at: (1) five different
squadrons, (2) from two different air groups, (3) deploying
to WestPac at different times, (4) for different tour
lengths. This makes the analysis particularly difficult to
structure since retention rates vary between units,
geographic location, and time. Table 6.6 provides examples
of differing retention rates covering periods in which
squadrons were not deployed to WestPac. The comparison
rates were chosen at random among the first three squadrons
deploying to WestPac under UDP and reflect all enlisted
personnel
.
The next question that must be answered prior to
analysis is how do we compare retention for six-month UDP to
one-year UDP? Do we compare them by individual squadrons or
groups, over separate periods or a block of periods?
Aggregrating the numbers into two groups (one-year and six-
month) makes the numbers larger and the retention rates more
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significant. Unfortunately for this analysis, the one-year
deploying units are from one location, MCAS Beaufort, and
TABLE 6.6
RETENTION RATE COMPARISON
Between Squadrons, Same Locale:
Eligible Reenlistinq Rate
Hawaii, 4th Qtr 1978
VMFA-2 3 5 19 0%
VMFA-212 21 3 14%
Between Squadrons, Different Locale:
3rd Qtr FY 1977
Hawaii VMFA-235 16 4 25%
Beaufort VMFA-251 11 4 36%
Between Squadrons, Different Locale, Long Time Period:
21 Month Time Period
Hawaii VMFA-212 139 12 9%
Beaufort VMFA-251 124 18 15%
Different Time Periods, Different Deployment Lengths:


















NOTE: VMFA-251 time period covers 2nd Qtr FY
thru 1st Qtr for the next FY.
the six-month units are from another location, MCAS Kaneohe
Bay. It is possible that the two groupings will reflect
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retention rate differences due to location as well as length
of UDP. However, an indication of the rate difference due
to location cannot be determined since none of the Beaufort
squadrons were assigned six-month UDP during this time
period. Certainly, comparisons can be made between Hawaii
and Beaufort at a later date since one-year UDP ceased in
1980; however, these comparisons would be over time periods
different from the one being investigated so the comparison
would be inconclusive. To complete this analysis, an
assumption must be made that there is no significant
difference in retention due solely to the fact that the
squadrons are home-based at two different locations.
Any comparison of retention between the two programs
needs to consider the element of time. One way to compare
alternatives is to normalize the data by leading or lagging,
so that all the squadrons begin deployment in the same time
period. The data would then be event-centered rather than
time-centered. This creates a problem in that the retention
rates being compared have occurred in two different periods
and the rates are not independent of time. The two groups
can be matched on a periodic basis. The problem incurred
here is that the groups consist of units that are deployed,
units preparing to deploy, and units finished with
deployment. Comparing the retention rate of deploying
Beaufort units to deploying Hawaii units in any particular
time period does not guarantee that any difference in
retention rates is due to differing deployment time lengths.
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Perhaps the best method for comparison is to pick a
block of time periods which would have equal amounts of
deployed time, predeployed time, and post deployed time for
each group. This is difficult since the comparison includes
two different cycles and unequal groupings (two squadrons
versus three squadrons). Figure 6.1 depicts the difference
in time frame required to include one year of deployment for





















To include one year of deployed time for Beaufort and
Hawaii squadrons, the time horizons must cover 24 months and
36 months, respectively. If all five squadrons are included
in a comparison, the time horizon for Hawaii must extend for
48 months to cover the three participating squadrons;
whereas it will require only 3 6 months to cover the two
Beaufort squadrons. The time horizons can be matched by
adding 12 months of the Beaufort squadrons retention figures
to the covered 24 months. This places a different
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complexion on the analysis. The behavior of the Beaufort
squadrons' personnel should be significantly different,
since they are no longer involved in UDP past the 24th
month. VMFA-251 will have 30 months of retention rates
which are subsequent to its 12 month deployment and VMFA-122
will have 12 months. This compares to 18, 12, and 6 months
for the Hawaii squadrons, VMFA-2 35, VMFA-212, and VMFA-232.
The question still remains, how to block the data
without biasing one or more of the squadrons' data. The
best choice may be to close down the block, as much as
possible, so that behavior changes are limited. Comparison
of the aggregates between Beaufort and Hawaii may even out
or at least provide an indication of retention trends. In
this case an assumption is made that the analysis will not
be significantly biased by shortening the time horizons and
comparing unequally divided blocks of data.
Appendix J contains the number of individuals eligible
for reenlistment , the number of those eligible who chose to
reenlist, and the resulting reenlistment rates. The data in
Appendix J covers the five squadrons that participated in
UDP during the first few years of the program. The figures
are for 21 months and are broken down quarterly. Two
different starting dates were considered, July 1977 and
October 1977. The range considered includes 18 months to 27
months. Table 6.7 depicts the effort to determine an
appropriate time horizon for analysis. The desire to limit
the analysis time period and to even out the deployed
periods, the periods prior to deployment, and the periods
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following deployment, make the time horizon of October 1977
through June 1979 the best alternative.
TABLE 6.7
TIME HORIZON ANALYSIS
Begining Month: July 1977 October 1977 —
Ending Month: 12/78 3/79 6/79 9/79 3/79 6/79 9/79 12/79
MAG-31 (Beaufort)















































































































When all enlisted personnel are considered, the
deploying squadrons of MAG-31 had an overall retention rate
of 25 percent, which was over three times the rate of MAG-24
squadrons. When E6 to E9 are considered, MAG-31 UDP
squadrons had a 38 percent retention rate compared to a 18
percent rate for MAG-24. This is a large difference among
SNCOs! In short, whether measured by overall retention or
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by retention of SNCOs, retention for one-year deployment
would appear to be much better than for six-month
deployment. This author is familiar with the Commanding
Officers of the Hawaii squadrons during the time period
undergoing analysis, and believes it is unlikely that
command climate and location are the only factors in
explaining the difference between retention rates. But, the
fact that variables such as home base and deployment time
period cannot be totally isolated for the comparison between
one-year and six-month deployments limits the author's
confidence in the results of Appendix J, which are
summarized in Table 6.8.
TABLE 6.8
RETENTION RATE SUMMARY










A conclusion cannot be made that one-year deploying
squadrons will always have better retention rates than six-
month deploying squadrons, ceteris paribus. However, the
magnitude of differences in retention rates between Beaufort
deploying squadrons and Hawaii squadrons supports the
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author's belief that changing UDP to one-year evolutions
will not adversely affect personnel retention in the fighter
community.
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VII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
There is no question in this author's mind that the
Marine Corps' Unit Deployment Program is the answer to
staffing WestPac and reducing PCS costs. Through the
implementation of UDP, the Marine Corps has reduced the
number of PCS billets by over 10,000. This has translated
into millions of dollars in cost savings. However, in the
face of future, possibly austere budgets, we need to search
for more savings.
This thesis proposes an alternative to the present UDP
of six-month deployments. Prior to the Vietnam Conflict, a
one-year unit transplacement program provided the necessary
units for WestPac duty. It is time to reconsider this
program. A one-year UDP can save the Marine Corps over $4
million in undiscounted, real terms between FY 1989 and FY
1993. These savings can be gained without adversely
affecting aircraft readiness, aircrew training readiness, or
personnel retention.
A change to one-year UDP could have a positive affect on
aircraft readiness. With its implemtation, the number of
deployments would be cut in half. Past NMCM figures
indicate that squadrons' aircraft readiness is lower than
average in four of the six months following UDP. Reducing
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the total number of months following UDP should decrease
NMCM and increase aircraft readiness.
A change to one-year UDP could have a positive effect on
aircrew training readiness. Flight readiness data for the
first 31 months of UDP was analyzed. It shows that the two
one-year UDP squadrons' average monthly training while
deployed to WestPac was 13 percent higher than their average
for the 31 month period. The corresponding figure for the
six-month UDP squadrons is six percent. In comparing
training accomplished during non-deployed time (excludes
Yuma deployments) , the six-month UDP squadrons monthly
average was 87 percent of their 31 month average. For the
one-year UDP squadrons, the figure is 83 percent. It
appears, from this data, that aircrew training readiness
will show a small increase, in the long run, if one-year UDP
is adopted.
Personnel retention is an important variable in the
fighter community's readiness. It is considered very
carefully in this thesis. Reenlistments rates for all
enlisted personnel and reenlistment rates for SNCOs are
analyzed, and a comparison is made between the present six-
month UDP and the proposed one-year UDP. The results appear
significant. The all-enlisted rate for the two one-year
squadrons was three times the rate for the three six-month
squadrons. When SNCO reenlistment rates are considered, the
retention rate for the one-year squadrons was twice the rate
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for the six-month squadrons. Although other causation
factors exist that cannot be totally isolated for the
analysis, the magnitudes of the differences lead this author
to believe that a one-year UDP will have a net positive
affect on the fighter community's all-enlisted and SNCO
retention rates.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The author recommends that the Marine Corps seriously
consider a one-year Unit Deployment Program. Cost savings
for transportation is a foregone conclusion; the amount may
be disputed. Based on the evidence presented here, aircraft
readiness or aircrew training are unlikely to suffer from a
change to one-year deployments. If they do suffer,
leadership and creativity can overcome any accrued negative
benefits. The one area in which we should not take chances
concerns our most valuable resource
—
people. Morale, both
individual and unit, is vitally important to the Marine
Corps. Morale certainly matters for retention. If a one-
year deployment evolution is considered, the Marine Corps
should expand the analysis of personnel retention. Other
possibilities for measuring the potential effects of one-
year UDP on morale should be investigated. The most obvious
is a formal survey of the fighter community or possibly the
entire fixed wing community. Although another WestPac tour
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APPENDIX A
FIGHTER SQUADRON DEPLOYMENT CHRONOLOGY FOR WESTPAC
DATES SODN A/C HOME BASE
Jun 77 __ Jun 78 VMFA-251 F-4J Beaufort, SC
Oct 77 - Apr 78 VMFA-235 F-4J Kaneohe Bay, HI
Apr 78 - Oct 78 VMFA-212 F-4J Kaneohe Bay, HI
# Jun 78 - Jun 79 VMFA-122 F-4J Beaufort, SC
Oct 78 - Apr 79 VMFA-2 32 F-4J Kaneohe Bay, HI
Apr 79 - Oct 79 VMFA-2 3 5 F-4J Kaneohe Bay, HI
Jun 79 - Jan 80 VMFA-312 F-4S Beaufort, SC
Oct 79 - Apr 80 VMFA-212 F-4J Kaneohe Bay, HI
# Jan 80 - Jun 80 VMFA-4 51 F-4S Beaufort, SC
# Apr 80 - Oct 80 VMFA-2 3 2 F-4J Kaneohe Bay, HI
Jun 80 - Jan 81 VMFA-3 3 3 F-4S Beaufort, SC
# Oct 80 - Apr 81 VMFA-2 3 5 F-4S Kaneohe Bay, HI
# Jan 81 - Jun 81 VMFA-312 F-4S Beaufort, SC
Apr 81 - Oct 81 VMFA-212 F-4S Kaneohe Bay, HI
Jun 81 - Jan 82 VMFA-4 51 F-4S Beaufort, SC
# Oct 81 - Apr 82 VMFA-2 3 2 F-4S Kaneohe Bay, HI
# Jan 82 - Jun 82 VMFA-3 3 3 F-4S Beaufort, SC
Apr 82 - Oct 82 VMFA-2 3 5 F-4S Kaneohe Bay, HI
Jun 82 - Jan 83 VMFA-312 F-4S Beaufort, SC
# Oct 82 - Apr 83 VMFA-212 F-4S Kaneohe Bay, HI
# Jan 83 - Jun 83 VMFA-4 51 F-4S Beaufort, SC
Apr 83 - Oct 83 VMFA-2 32 F-4S Kaneohe Bay, HI
Jun 83 - Jan 84 VMFA-3 3 3 F-4S Beaufort, SC
# Oct 83 - Apr 84 VMFA-2 3 5 F-4S Kaneohe Bay, HI
# Jan 84 - Jun 84 VMFA-312 F-4S Beaufort, SC
Apr 84 - Oct 84 VMFA-212 F-4S Kaneohe Bay, HI
Jun 84 - Jan 85 VMFA-4 51 F-4S Beaufort, SC
# Oct 84 - Apr 85 VMFA-23 2 F-4S Kaneohe Bay, HI
# Jan 85 - Jun 85 VMFA-3 3 3 F-4S Beaufort, SC
Apr 85 - Oct 85 VMFA-2 3 5 F-4S Kaneohe Bay, HI
Jun 85 - Jan 86 VMFA-312 F-4S Beaufort, SC
# Oct 85 - Apr 86 VMFA-212 F-4S Kaneohe Bay, HI
# Jan 86 - Jun 86 VMFA-4 51 F-4S Beaufort, SC
Apr 86 - Oct 86 VMFA-2 32 F-4S Kaneohe Bay, HI
Jun 86 - Jan 87 VMFA-3 3 3 F-4S Beaufort, SC
# Oct 86 - Apr 87 VMFA-23 5 F-4S Kaneohe Bay, HI
# Jan 87 - Jun 87 VMFA-312 F-4S Beaufort, SC
Apr 87 - Oct 87 VMFA-212 F-4S Kaneohe Bay, HI
Jun 87 - Jan 88 VMFA-115 F/A-18 Beaufort, SC
# Oct 87 - Apr 88 VMFA-232 F-4S Kaneohe Bay, HI
# Jan 88 - Jun 88 VMFA-122 F/A-18 Beaufort, SC
Apr 88 - Oct 88 VMFA-531 F/A-18 El Toro, CA
Jun 88 - Jan 89 VMFA-2 51 F/A-18 Beaufort, SC
» Oct 88 - Apr 89 VMFA-32 3 F/A-18 El Toro, CA





COMMERCIAL AND MILITARY TRANSPORTATION RATES











CAT Y Tariffs (FY)
Year St. Louis Los Angeles Honolulu
1989 532 392 330
1987 500 355 313
1986 579 382 304
1985 579 472 313
1984 655 534 329
1983 663 540 333
1982 668 544 335
Notes: 1. CAT B RATES are cents per passenger per seat
available for DC-10 commercial aircraft.
2. C-141 FHR Tariffs are dollars per flying hour.
3. CAT Y Tariffs are dollars per one-way passenger,





Year Quarterly Calendar Year Fiscal Year
1989 * 124.2
1988 * 4th 122.9 * 121.2
1987 4th 118.9 117.7
1986 4th 115.3 113.9


















































REFINER AND GAS PLANT OPERATOR PRICES OF
KEROSENE TYPE JET FUEL TO END USERS
(Cents per Gallon)










Notes: 1. Sales to end users are those made directly to
the ultimate consumer such as agriculture and the
military, as well as residential and commercial
customers.
2. Geographic coverage is the 50 states and the
District of Columbia.
3. Prices prior to January 1983 are Energy
Information Administration estimates.
4. Fiscal Year 1981 and 1980 prices in constant
1988 dollars were not computed since they are not
reguired for regression.












1989 - 1993 FORECAST SCHEDULE FOR FIGHTER SQUADRON
DEPLOYMENT TO WESTPAC
DATES SODN A/ C HOME BASE
# Jan 89 wm Jun 89 VMFA-333 F/A-18 Beaufort , SC
Apr 89 - Oct 89 VMFA--314 F/A-18 El Toro, CA
Jun 89 - Jan 90 TBD F/A--18 Beaufort , SC
# Oct 89 - Apr 90 VMFA--531 F/A-18 El Toro, CA
# Jan 90 - Jun 90 TBD F/A-18 Beaufort , SC
Apr 90 - Oct 90 VMFA--323 F/A-18 El Toro, CA
Jun 90 - Jan 91 TBD F/A--18 Beaufort , SC
# Oct 90 - Apr 91 VMFA--314 F/A--18 El Toro, CA
# Jan 91 - Jun 91 TBD F/A-18 Beaufort , SC
Apr 91 - Oct 91 VMFA--212 F/A--18 Kaneohe Bay, HI
Jun 91 - Jan 92 TBD F/A--18 Beaufort , SC
# Oct 91 - Apr 92 TBD F/A--18 Kaneohe Bay, HI
# Jan 92 - Jun 92 TBD F/A--18 Beaufort , SC
Apr 92 - Oct 92 TBD F/A--18 Kaneohe Bay, HI
Jun 92 - Jan 93 TBD F/A--18 Beaufort
, SC
# Oct 92 - Apr 93 TBD F/A--18 Kaneohe Bay, HI
# Jan 93 - Jun 93 TBD F/A--18 Beaufort , SC
Apr 93 - Oct 93 TBD F/A--18 Kaneohe Bay, HI
Jun 93 - Jan 94 TBD F/A--18 Beaufort , SC
# Oct 93 - Apr 94 TBD F/A--18 Kaneohe Bay, HI
# Squadrons do not TransPac aircraft; instead aircraft
are exchanged.
NOTE: UDP responsibility should revert from the 3rd
Marine Aircraft Wing to the 1st Marine Brigade in
April 1991. Marine Corps transition to the F/A-18
should be completed by this time. TransPac
normally occurs during spring and summer due to




EQUIPMENT TRANSPORTATION COSTS VIA C-141
(Then Year Dollars)
Years FHR Tariff Beaufort El Toro Kaneohe Bay
1988 $2,247 $ 93,512 $72,972 $67,358
1989 $2,507 $105,412 $82,298 $75,802
Fliaht Hours
1988 41.62 32.48 29.98
1989 42.05 32.83 30.24
Average1 41.85 32.66 30.11
Notes: 1. Flight hour figures were not converted to
hours and minutes since this was not necessary for
further computations.




1. Flight Hours . These are measured as the total time an
aircraft is in actual flight, takeoff to landing.
2. Sorties . These are the number of individual aircraft
flights.
3. Aircraft Utilization . This measure is determined by
dividing the number of monthly flight hours by the average
number of aircraft assigned to the unit during the month.
4. Aircraft Status Codes . Squadrons must account for the
status of all aircraft twenty-four hours a day, every day it
is in service to the squadron. A thirty-day month would
have 720 Equipment In Service (EIS) hours for each aircraft.
The following description is an over simplification of the
Maintenance Data System (MDS) and omits several categories
which do not add to the discussion.
a. Mission Capable (MC) . MC is that percentage of EIS
hours that an aircraft is mechanically capable of performing
at least one of its assigned missions. For example, even if
the radar was not operational, the aircraft could still
perform a manual bombing mission.
(1) Full Mission Capable (FMC) . FMC is that
percentage of EIS hours in which an aircraft is mechanically
capable of performing all of its assigned missions (all
systems fully operational)
.
(2) Partial Mission Capable (PMC) . PMC is that
percentage of EIS hours in which an aircraft is mechanically
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capable of performing only some of its assigned missions.
(a) Partial Mission Capable Maintenance (PMCM)
.
PMCM is that percentage of EIS hours in which an aircraft is
PMC and maintenance is either being performed or could be
performed and no supply parts are on order.
(b) Partial Mission Capable Supply (PMCS)
.
PMCS is that percentage of EIS hours in which an aircraft is
PMC and replacements parts needed to place the aircraft in a
FMC status have been ordered but not received. Once parts
are received the aircraft would be placed in a PMCM status
until the parts are installed an the functioning checked.
b. Not Mission Capable (NMC) . NMC is that percentage
of EIS hours in which an aircraft is incapable of performing
any of its assigned missions. Safety is the key ingredient.
For example, aircraft are not allowed to fly without certain
instruments or with leaks in the hydraulics system.
(1) Not Mission Capable Maintenance (NMCM) . NMCM
is that percentage of EIS hours in which an aircraft is NMC
due to unscheduled maintenance.
(2) Not Mission Capable Supply (NMCS) . NMCS is
that percentage of EIS hours in which an aircraft is NMC due
to parts on order.
The following formulas exist based on the previous
definitions.
MC = FMC + PMC NMC = NMCM + NMCS
100% = MC + NMC PMC = PMCM + PMCS
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APPENDIX H
AIRCREW MISSION CODE TOTALS
OCTOBER 1977 - JUNE 1980
VMFA-251 Periods
* * * * * * * * *
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Completion 114 55 136 110 129 126 149 107 79
Refresher 84 63 102 106 111 257 194 193 95
Other 18 16 30 30 20 22 15 20 26
Incompletion 18 36 46 42 66 55 40 56 28
Total 234 170 314 288 326 460 398 376 228
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Total 276 358 324 430 254 295
18
Completion 82 90 121 111 74 79 77 129 85
Refresher 92 114 137 131 126 173 183 193 149
Other 4 14 15 12 12 28 10 48 16
Incompletion 30 10 29
Total 208 228 302 254 212 280 270 370 250
Y
19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
Completion 441 74 108 96 63 72 107 64 47
Refresher 95 140 194 160 95 130 211 168 127
Other 50 4 6 10 4 44 22 14 16
Incompletion 8 2 14 4 24 24




Completion 97 111 153 184 91 111
Refresher 121 199 117 156 86 141
Other 18 22 40 60 41 22
Incompletion 40 26 14 30 36 21
NOTES: 1. Periods are one month.
2. Asterisks indicate UDP during the period.
3. A ' Y' indicates deployed to MCAS Yuma, AZ
.
4. July 1978 is excluded from the totals. Only 17
sorties were flown due to delay in rotation and




71 2 3 4 5 6 8 9
Completion 122 131 123 135 110 132 380 121 111
Refresher 96 66 81 63 118 151 108 77 54
Other 8 17 42 16 18 29 16 12 17
Incompletion 42 16 26 34 34 20 62 24 30
Total 268 230 272 248 280 332 244 234 212
* * * * * * * * *
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Completion 92 201 163 148 271 154 154 68 135
Refresher 106 145 187 66 85 223 218 246 365
Other 6 8 20 98 30 26 6 14 16







354 446 458 446 398
Y
553
19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
Completion 184 75 56 114 56 61 90 295 105
Refresher 264 297 147 111 123 153 146 75 119
Other 12 18 21 24 19 40 70 6 18
Incompletion 36 40 36 46 50 34 36 42 86
Total 496 430 260 295 248 288 342 418 328
28 29 30 31 32 AVG
Completion 90 35 55 35 91 128
Refresher 127 65 121 105 81 137
Other 11 2 8 20 13 21
Incompletion 32 28 58 30 20 43
Total 260 130 242 190 205 329
NOTES
:
1. Periods are one month.
2. Asterisks indicate UDP during the period.
3. A ' Y" indicates deployed to MCAS Yuma, AZ
.
4. July 1979 is excluded from the totals. Only 30
sorties were flown due to delay in rotation and
acceptance of new aircraft.
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VMFA-2 35 Periods
* * * * * *
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Completion 152 172 129 165 137 73 120 224 142
Refresher 56 160 93 111 154 88 38 38 110
Other 80 36 18 32 7 120 68 36 14
Incompletion 42 28 40 54 32 59 18 28 6




340 244 326 272
*
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Completion 218 242 410 454 231 250 234 240 153
Refresher 88 50 52 50 22 16 30 41 59
Other 12 22 22 18 44 10 18 12 64
Incompletion 22 12 22 16 18 12 10 19 38
Total 340 326 506 538 315 288 292 312 314
* * * * *
19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
Completion 154 192 247 177 185 176 155 138 155
Refresher 160 76 74 131 92 140 63 18 3
Other 16 18 10 8 64 20 46 26 24
Incompletion 30 38 11 10 14 10 12 12
Total 360 324 342 326 355 346 266 194 194
Total
28 29 30 31 32 33
174 150 206 260 300 274
AVG
Completion 54 96 148 230 260 200 191
Refresher 59 4 5 2 5 40 64
Other 39 44 47 18 25 26 32




1. Periods are one month.
2. Asterisks indicate UDP during the period.




Y Y * * *
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Completion 469 472 190 219 156 221 195 341 237
Refresher 154 120 10 11 20 24 26 45 31
Other 45 10 6 28 42 48 27 12 4







290 230 336 292 436 376
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Completion 352 130 289 129 242 263 342 283 256
Refresher 42 10 33 54 16 5 6 15 2
Other 12 4 10 17 2 34 10 18 16
Incompletion 32 36 42 20 42 44 42 24 48






19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
Completion 289 311 186 282 364 254 270 404 350
Refresher 2 3 2 4 2 2 2 2 2
Other 15 14 14 40 26 26 96 18 12







342 412 294 380 444 368
28 29 30 31 32 33 AVG
Completion 468 504 300 250 370 265 293
Refresher 4 2 20
Other 4 10 18 22 16 37 23
Incompletion 32 10 2 8 4 27
Total 508 526 320 272 394 306 363
NOTES:
1. Periods are one month.
2. Asterisks indicate UDP during the period.





1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Completion 17 126 94 134 129 180 235 464 163
Refresher 36 32 51 38 22 103 142 96 57
Other 104 18 50 19 63 21 36 28 36
Incompletion 9 34 19 71 24 28 37 46 44
Total 166 210 214 262 238 332 450 634 300
* * * * * *
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Completion 185 80 64 110 252 104 109 148 111
Refresher 69 46 56 168 86 85 100 58 24
Other 66 46 88 102 129 139 171 256 151
Incompletion 40 60 8 42 27 38 52 8 12




19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
Completion 144 193 190 118 132 181 207 540 218
Refresher 122 51 68 100 50 73 42 141 54
Other 40 64 38 40 110 26 35 41 16
Incompletion 40 40 14 6 16 10 12 26 8







28 29 30 31 32 33 AVG
Completion 141 59 66 49 269 143 162
Refresher 29 120 80 83 190 127 79
Other 16 8 40 104 34 44 66
Incompletion 10 17 2 16 31 10 26
Total 196 204 188 252 524 324 333
NOTES
:
1. Periods are one month.
2. Asterisks indicate UDP during the period.




AIRCREW MISSION CODE TOTALS, WEIGHTED
OCTOBER 1977 - JUNE 1980
VMFA-251 Periods
* * * * * * * * *
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Completion 798 385 952 770 903 882 1043 749 553
Refresher 336 252 408 424 444 1028 776 772 380
Other 36 32 60 60 40 44 30 40 52
Incompletion 42 28 40 54 32 59 18 28 6
Total 1212 697 1460 1308 1419 2013 1867 1589 991
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Completion 574 630 847 777 518 553 539 903 595
Refresher 368 456 548 524 504 692 732 772 596
Other 8 28 30 24 24 56 20 96 32




1126 1447 1341 1064 1313 1301 1790 1261
20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
Completion 3087 518 756 672 441 504 749 448 329
Refresher 380 560 776 640 380 520 844 672 508
Other 100 8 12 20 8 88 44 28 32
Incompletion 30 38 11 10 14 10 12 12
Total 3597 1124 1555 1342
Y
31
843 1122 1637 1160 881
28 29 30 32 AVG
Completion 679 777 1071 1288 637 111
Refresher 484 796 468 624 344 564
Other 36 44 80 120 82 44
Incompletion 22 6 6 10 10 21
Total 1221 1623 1625 2042 1073 1407
NOTES: 1. Periods are one month.
2. Asterisks indicate UDP during the period.
3. A • Y' indicates deployed to MCAS Yuma, AZ
.
4. Weights are as follows: Completion (X7)
,
Refresher (X4) , Other (X2) , Incompletion (XI)
5. July 1978 is excluded from the totals. Only 17
sorties were flown due to delay in rotation and




Completion 854 917 861 945 770 924 2660 847 777
Refresher 384 264 324 252 472 604 432 308 216
Other 16 34 84 32 36 58 32 24 34
Incompletion 42 28 40 54 32 59 18 28 6
Total 1296 1243 1309 1283 1310 1645 3142 1207 1033
*********
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Completion 644 1407 1141 1036 1897 1078 1078 476 945
Refresher 424 580 748 264 340 892 872 984 1460
Other 12 16 40 196 60 52 12 28 32
Incompletion 22 12 22 16 18 12 10 19 38
Total 1102 2015 1951 1512 2315 2034 1972 1507 2475
* * * Y
19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
Completion 1288 525 392 798 392 427 630 2065 735
Refresher 1056 1188 588 444 492 612 584 300 476
Other 24 36 42 48 38 80 140 12 36
Incompletion 30 38 11 10 14 10 12 12
Total 2398 1787 1033 1300 936 1129 1354 2389 1259
28 29 30 31 32 AVG
Completion 630 245 385 245 637 896
Refresher 508 260 484 420 324 548
Other 22 4 16 40 26 42
Incompletion 22 6 6 10 10 21
Total 1182 515 891 715 997 1507
NOTES
:
1. Periods are one month.
2. Asterisks indicate UDP during the period.
3. A • Y' indicates deployed to MCAS Yuma, AZ
.
4. Weights are as follows: Completion (X7)
,
Refresher (X4), Other (X2) , Incompletion (XI).
5. July 1979 is excluded from the totals. Only 30
sorties were flown due to delay in rotation and
acceptance of new aircraft.
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VMFA-235 Periods
* * * * * *
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Completion 1064 1204 903 1155 959 511 840 1586 994
Refresher 224 640 372 444 616 352 152 152 440
Other 160 72 26 64 14 240 136 72 28
Incompletion 42 28 40 54 32 59 18 28 6
Total 1490 1944 1351 1717 1621 1162 1146 1820 1468
Y Y *
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Completion 526 1694 2870 3178 1617 1750 1638 1680 1071
Refresher 352 200 208 200 88 64 120 184 236
Other 24 44 44 36 88 20 36 24 128
Incompletion 22 12 22 16 18 12 10 19 38
Total 1924 1950 3144 3430 1811 1846 1804 1887 1473
* * * * *
19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
Completion 1078 1344 1729 1239 1295 1232 1099 966 1085
Refresher 640 304 296 524 368 560 252 72 12
Other 32 36 20 16 128 40 92 52 48
Incompletion 30 38 11 10 14 10 12 12
Total 1780 1722 2056 1789 1805 1842 1443 1102 1157
28 29 30 31 32 33 AVG
Completion 378 672 1036 1610 1820 1400 1337
Refresher 236 16 20 8 20 160 256
Other 78 88 94 36 50 52 64
Incompletion 22 6 6 10 10 8 20
Total 714 782 1156 1664 1900 1620 1682
NOTES
:
1. Periods are one month.
2. Asterisks indicate UDP during the period.
3. A ' Y' indicates deployed to MCAS Yuma, AZ
.
4. Weights are as follows: Completion (X7)
,
Refresher (X4), Other (X2), Incompletion (XI).
98
VMFA-212 Periods
Y Y * * *123456789
Completion 3283 3304 1330 1533 1092 1547 1365 2387 1659
Refresher 616 480 40 44 80 96 104 180 124
Other 90 20 12 56 84 96 54 24 72
Incompletion 42 28 40 54 32 59 18 28 6
Total 4031 3832 1422 1687 1288 1798 1541 2619 1861
* * *
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Completion 2464 910 2023 903 1694 1841 2394 1981 1792
Refresher 168 40 132 216 64 20 24 60 8
Other 24 8 20 34 4 68 20 36 32
Incompletion 22 12 22 16 18 12 10 19 38
Total 2678 970 2197 1169 1780 1941 2448 2096 1870
* * *
19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
Completion 2023 2177 1302 1974 2548 1778 1890 2828 2450
Refresher 8 128 16888 88
Other 30 28 28 80 52 52 192 36 24
Incompletion 30 38 11 10 14 10 12 12
Total 2091 2255 1349 2080 2622 1848 2090 2884 2494
* * *
28 29 30 31 32 33 AVG
Completion 3276 3528 2100 1750 2590 1855 2051
Refresher 16 8 80
Other 8 20 36 44 32 74 46
Incompletion 22 6 6 10 10 8 20
Total 3322 3562 2142 1804 2632 1937 2192
NOTES
:
1. Periods are one month.
2. Asterisks indicate UDP during the period.
3. A 'Y' indicates deployed to MCAS Yuma, AZ
.








Completion 119 882 658 938 903 1260 1645 3248 1141
Refresher 144 128 204 152 88 412 568 384 228
Other 208 36 100 38 126 42 72 56 72
Incompletion 42 28 40 54 32 59 18 28 6
Total 513 1074 1002 1182 1149 1773 2303 3716 1447
******
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Completion 1295 560 448 770 1764 728 763 1036 777
Refresher 276 184 224 672 344 340 400 232 96
Other 132 92 176 204 258 278 342 512 302
Incompletion 22 12 22 16 18 12 10 19 38
Total 1725 848 870 1662 2384 1358 1515 1799 1213
Y Y
19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
Completion 1008 1351 1330 826 924 1267 1449 3780 1526
Refresher 488 204 272 400 200 292 168 564 216
Other 80 128 76 80 220 52 70 82 32
Incompletion 30 38 11 10 14 10 12 12
Total 1606 1721 1689 1316 1358 1621 1687 4438 1786
* * *
28 29 30 31 32 33 AVG
Completion 987 413 462 343 1883 1001 1134
Refresher 116 480 320 332 760 508 316
Other 32 16 80 208 68 88 132
Incompletion 22 6 6 10 10 8 20
Total 1157 915 868 893 2721 1605 1603
NOTES
:
1. Periods are one month.
2. Asterisks indicate UDP during the period.
3. A 'Y' indicates deployed to MCAS Yuma, AZ
.
4. Weights are as follows: Completion (X7)
,




OCTOBER 1977 through JUNE 1979
ALL ENLISTED PERSONNEL:
Periods
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total
VMFA-2 51
Eligible 9 8 15 17 26 20 29 124
Reenlisted 2 6 2 3 5 18
Rate 22% 0% 40% 0% 8% 15% 17% 15%
VMFA-12 2
Eligible 12 10 8 20 13 23 26 112
Reenlisted 4 4 1 6 4 10 11 40
Rate 33% 40% 13% 30% 31% 43% 42% 36%
MAG-31 (Deploying)
Eligible 21 18 23 37 39 43 55 236
Reenlisted 6 4 7 6 6 13 16 58
Rate 29% 22% 30% 16% 15% 30% 36% 25%
VMFA-2 3 5
Eligible 10 5 18 39 19 23 26 140
Reenlisted 1 3 4 3 3 14
Rate 10% 0% 17% 10% 0% 13% 12% 10%
VMFA-212
Eligible 15 11 11 21 21 25 35 139
Reenlisted 1 3 4 2 2 12
Rate 0% 9% 0% 14% 19% 8% 8% 9%
VMFA-2 3 2
Eligible 15 17 18 40 12 18 27 147
Reenlisted 1 1 2 4 8
Rate 7% 6% 0% 0% 17% 0% 15% 5%
MAG-24
Eligible 40 33 47 100 52 66 88 426
Reenlisted 2 2 3 7 6 5 9 34
Rate 5% 6% 6% 7% 12% 8% 10% 8%
Notes:
1. Each period covers three months.
2. Bold figures are for quarters in which the unit was
deployed to WestPac.
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E6 to E9 (SNCO)
:
1 2 3 4
Periods














































































































































































1. Each period covers three months.
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